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Has 
medicine 
advanced 
too  
far 
that we can save 
    a     man’s life    who 
   has    only one      limb 
and no 
balls? 
●● 
If 
asked    would 
most       soldiers 
               prefer 
              to  
__________DIE___ 
than to live this life? 
THAT TAKES BALLS.     
                                                                                   
© TJ Hodgetts 2008   
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Abstract 
 
Background: Military medicine has historically advanced in war. Advances in 
concepts, technology, organisation and operational processes have occurred during 
the contemporary conflicts of the last decade. Aims: To determine whether the 
advances constitute a ‘Revolution in Military Medical Affairs (RM2A)’; to demonstrate 
my role within a revolutionary transformation; and to introduce new theory to 
determine if advances have been appropriately matched to clinical need. 
Definition: An RM2A is defined here as a radical change in the character or practice 
of military medicine. Methods: 20 papers are selected (15 first author; 5 second 
author) that describe the changes in modern combat casualty care. These are 
clustered into conceptual (doctrine) innovation; changes to organisational structure 
and operational processes; and advances in technology. These are analysed against 
Lambeth’s (1997) criteria for a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); Cohen’s (2009) 
three tests for an RMA, but adapted for an RM2A; and Toffler’s (1993) criteria for a 
‘true revolution’. The null hypothesis for the novel theory (Homunculus Casualty 
Theorem) states that the concept, training, equipment and practice changes within 
the RM2A are not correspondingly or proportionately matched in importance to the 
immediately life-threatening injuries and physiology of contemporary combat trauma. 
Results: The creation of new concepts (<C>ABC, DCR) and doctrine (MIMMS, 1st 
Aid) are demonstrated, incorporating a raft of novel heuristics. Developments in 
trauma governance are described that have provided both the evidence to drive 
change and the proof of effect of change. Specific evidence for avoidable in-hospital 
cardiac arrest is presented, together with an organisational solution for prevention 
that highlights the NHS barriers to innovation adoption. The results of system 
transformation are demonstrated as a cohort of 75 unexpected survivors of critical 
combat injury; traumatic cardiac arrest survival of 24% is unexpectedly high. 
Conclusions: An RM2A is proven that meets the sentinel criteria. The scope of 
advances in combat casualty care has appropriately reflected clinical need 
particularly for the rapid and effective treatment of haemorrhage, although battlefield 
analgesia has failed to advance. Most importantly, it is asserted that the proven 
RM2A is responsible for the unexpected positive outcomes following critical combat 
injury. There is evidence I have played a central role in this transformation of military 
medicine. Effort to transfer the learning into NHS practice has begun. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
This study evaluates the profound changes in the early management of combat injury 
within the United Kingdom (UK) Defence setting in the decade from 1999-2009. 
Fundamentally it aims to prove that these changes are genuinely ‘revolutionary’ and 
determines my role as a leader of revolutionary change through analysis of a body of 
published work. 
 
Individual components of conceptual, organisational and practical change described 
in this study have contributed to improved outcomes in critical injury. The work 
explains the objective basis for claiming improved outcomes; benchmarks 
performance to civilian norms; investigates how specific components have added 
value; demonstrates the complexity of change through a chronology of serial 
innovation; and postulates how civilian healthcare systems can learn from military 
operational experience. 
 
Collectively, the work is a synthesis of systematic developments in contemporary 
combat casualty care attributable to the author. It represents a unique organisational 
history and reveals the logic of the underpinning academic model to drive 
comprehensive change across all Defence Lines of Development.1 Through the 
supporting framework of publications, this study aims to demonstrate my contribution 
to furthering medical knowledge within the domain of combat casualty care.  
 
“It will be tragic if medical historians can look back on the World War II period and 
write of it as a time when so much was learned and so little remembered.” 
Henry Beecher (1951). Early Care of the Seriously Wounded Man 
 
The author’s contribution to developing combat casualty care is extended over time 
and is complex: the elements are interlinked and paint a complete picture over time. 
Table 1.1 is an overview of the author’s responsibility for key development 
milestones and relates them to the publications presented in this thesis that prove an 
addition to the body of medical knowledge.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Defence Lines of Development are Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Doctrine, Organisation, 
Information and Logistics (TEPID OIL). 
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Year Author innovation Related thesis publications 
1998 New concept and new equipment. 
Development of Paediatric Triage Tape.  
Journal article (Paper 1) 
1999 New concepts and new curriculum. 
Battlefield First Aid made simple and 
systematic. ‘Control then ACT’ concept 
introduced. 
Journal article (Paper 2) 
 
Supporting book: Battlefield First Aid Drills 
2000 New process of operational governance. A 
system for trauma governance introduced 
on operations in Kosovo. 
Journal article (Paper 3) 
2000 New concepts and new curriculum. An 
international, all-hazard system of multiple 
casualty management is developed and its 
effectiveness evaluated. Concepts include 
‘METHANE message’ and ‘CSCATTT’. 
Journal article (Paper 4) 
 
Supporting books: Major Incident Medical 
Management & Support; Major Incident 
Management System 
2002 New evidence to prevent cardiac arrest & 
new national curriculum.  
Journal articles (Papers 5 & 6) 
2005 New understanding of the requirements for 
treating civilians during military operations. 
Journal article (Paper 7) 
2005 Leadership for adoption of new 
equipment. Leadership to rapidly introduce 
topical haemostatics and evaluate clinician 
attitudes to implementation. 
Journal article (Paper 8) 
2006 New concept. Developed and introduced 
<C>ABC concept. Widespread impact on 
clinical training, equipment and practice. 
Journal article (Paper 9) 
2006 New concepts, curriculum & practices. 
BATLS course fundamentally revised. New 
concepts/practices propagated included 
<C>ABC, MIST and TRaPS. 
Journal articles (series relates to Paper 10) 
 
Supporting books: Joint Services Publication 
570; Joint Doctrine Publication 4-03.1 
2007 Improved standards of trauma 
governance. A template for best practice is 
described. 
Journal article (Paper 11) 
2007 Improved clinical practice and improved 
protection from injury. Analysis of 
systematic post mortem examination of 
military operational deaths. 
Journal article (Paper 12) 
2007 New understanding of evacuation timelines 
in order to improve them. 
Journal article (Paper 13) 
2007 Leadership for adoption of new 
equipment. Leadership to rapidly introduce 
commercial tourniquets and evaluate their 
effectiveness. 
Journal article (Paper 14) 
2007 New concept. Damage Control 
Resuscitation developed and introduced. 
Journal article (Paper 15) 
2007 New practice. Guidance for the use of 
recombinant Factor VIIa in combat trauma 
developed and introduced. 
Journal article (Paper 16) 
2007 New understanding of differences between 
military and civilian trauma care. 
Journal article (Paper 17) 
2009 New understanding of the differences 
between military and civilian pre-hospital 
care. 
Journal article (Paper 18) 
2010 New process of operational governance 
introduced (Joint Theatre Clinical Case 
Conference) with evidence of its 
effectiveness.  
Journal article (Paper 19) 
2011 New evidence of improved clinical outcome 
as summative effect of other process, 
equipment and practice changes introduced 
by author. 
Journal article (Paper 20) 
 
Table 1.1: Key Milestones in Combat Casualty Care—Author’s Contribution 
Note: The numbered articles referred to in the 3rd column are listed in full in Table 2.1. 
Supporting books are listed in the Reference section. 
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The developments in combat casualty care have been non-linear. An analogy is 
drawn to completing a painting over a ten-year interval, one colour at a time, until a 
clear picture is interpretable. This is an image of success (Figure 1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Building a picture of success for combat casualty care 
[Colonel Hodgetts shown with ‘Pride of Britain’ award to the Field Hospital in Afghanistan, 2009] 
 
1.2 Uniqueness of the study 
The concept of a Revolution in Military Medical Affairs is novel to this thesis. In 
addition, a new theory has been framed for the thesis to evaluate whether the 
direction of the ‘revolution’ has matched the clinical need—the Homunculus Casualty 
Theorem. Together these introduce a new vernacular and prism through which to 
view past and future developments in combat casualty care, reinforcing the 
contribution to the body of medical knowledge. 
 
Research questions 
Has there been a Revolution in Military Medical Affairs? 
How does this body of work contribute to the revolution? 
 
1.3 Constraints 
Critical analysis of supporting publications is constrained by required brevity: it is 
necessarily selective and subjective to my preference.2 The works selected are a 
balance between publications that represent the greatest contribution to changing 
medical practice, while meeting the conditions of first or second authorship.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A list of personal publications is at Annex A (books, book chapters and peer-reviewed papers only). 
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1.4 Background 
An enduring certainty of war is casualties. The responsibility of treating UK combat 
casualties falls to the Defence Medical Services (DMS). In 1994 a Defence spending 
review reduced the DMS by such a degree that in 1997 the House of Commons 
Defence Committee (HCDC) questioned whether the organisation could survive as a 
separate entity. Further, it was concluded that: 
 
“…the DMS are not sufficient to provide proper support to the front line in all 
realistic planning scenarios and show little prospect of being able to do so in 
the future.” (HCDC, 1999, p.vii) 
 
The Committee later expressed that the DMS would have been incapable of 
supporting a ground invasion of Kosovo in 1999, rather than the less resource 
demanding stabilisation operation that was undertaken after over 2 months of 
sustained bombing. 
 
In response to initial criticism, the DMS began to develop a strategy for 
organisational restructuring and capability enhancement (UK MoD, 1998). This 
included an innovation to represent the NHS Executive on the Defence Medical 
Board with the intention of ensuring that DMS policies accorded with NHS best 
practice. The strong inference that the perceived deliverable standard of DMS care 
was below that of the NHS was being reinforced. 
 
Ten years later in 2009 the Healthcare Commission (HCC), now the Care Quality 
Commission, published a comprehensive review of the treatment of combat 
casualties from point of wounding to rehabilitation. The report stated that the 
standard of treatment for those seriously injured on operations overseas was now 
‘exemplary’, the results achieved were the ‘best ever reported’ and that this was a 
‘truly remarkable achievement’ (HCC, 2009, p.13). Paradoxically, it was recognised 
that the patient’s journey was now optimally efficient and ‘there is much that could be 
learned by the trauma services within the NHS’.  
 
Additional objective evidence demonstrates that the injury severity of combat 
casualty survivors is rising (Kelly et al, 2008) and combat casualties as a group have 
statistically more serious injuries than civilians injured in the UK (Hodgetts et al, 
2007a, Paper 17). Despite these trends, there is a growing cohort of combat 
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casualties since 2008 that are judged to be ‘unexpected survivors’ by mathematical 
modelling and clinical peer review (Russell, Hodgetts et al, 2011, Paper 20). The 
impact on survival of physical conditioning and limited comorbidity could be queried, 
but has not been quantified. Importantly however, there are casualties that could only 
have survived within the sophisticated military trauma system—with the deduction 
that they would have died if treated in the NHS. This is supported by the National 
Audit Office’s (NAO) independent comparison of system outcomes in 2010, which 
confirms favourable military system performance over the NHS (NAO, 2010). The 
stark contrast in assessment of DMS capability over this period implies profound 
change. To determine if this is ‘revolutionary’ change first requires definition of the 
related academic terminology. 
 
1.5 Defining Revolution—RMA & RM2A 
1.5.1 Revolution in Military Affairs 
The term Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has been applied to contemporary 
advances in conventional warfare and is a starting point to defining a revolutionary 
approach to improving combat casualty care. However, RMA lacks a single 
attributable definition. At its simplest, Colin Gray (2006, p.105) describes it as:  
 
‘A radical change in the character or conduct or war’.  
 
Benjamin Lambeth’s (1997, p.75) definition usefully builds on this foundation and 
describes an RMA as: 
 
‘The innovative application of technologies which, combined with dramatic 
changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, 
fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations’.  
 
Andrew Krepinevich’s (1994, p.30) definition strongly resonates with Lambeth’s: he 
explicitly lists four components that must be present to satisfy a ‘revolution’. These 
components are given in Table 1.2 and are paired with Lambeth’s criteria. Doctrine is 
defined as ‘a belief or set of beliefs held and taught’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 
2012): Lambeth’s ‘doctrine change’ does not accurately match Krepinevich’s 
‘systems development’. All the transformation described in this thesis is linked to 
advancing the military trauma system: for this reason Lambeth’s criteria are used to 
determine revolutionary change as they offer slightly broader differentiation. The 
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colour codes employed in Table 1.2 are carried through this thesis to the evidence 
section to identify how each submitted paper meets an established criterion for 
revolution. 
 
Lambeth’s Criteria (1997) Krepinevich’s Criteria (1994) 
Military doctrine change Systems development 
Operational concept change Operational innovation 
Organisational concept change Organisational adaptation 
Technology innovation Technological change 
Table 1.2: Criteria for a Revolution in Military Affairs 
 
Alternative definitions vary little other than semantics. What all share in common is 
recognition that an RMA is more than technological change, as is implied from the 
original Soviet use of the term ‘military technical revolution’ in the 1960s. Max Boot 
(2006) proposes that it is not technology per se that creates a revolution, but how 
organisations respond to technological advances: this depends on their organisation, 
leadership, morale, training and human factors. Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1993) view 
the technological aspect of RMA from a different perspective. They note that more 
often than not an invention has only created a better or more efficient way of doing 
the same things within the ‘existing game’—and these are more accurately classified 
as ‘sub-revolutions’. For a ‘true revolution’ the innovation must change the rules of 
the game, its equipment, the size and organisation of the teams, their training, 
doctrine and tactics.  
 
1.5.2 Revolution in Military Medical Affairs 
Beaty (1997) is the first to consider RMA from a medical perspective. He predicted a 
potential revolution in relation to changes in the geostrategic environment, 
information technology and medical practice that would shape how US medical 
services may be configured and employed in peace and conflict in the 21st Century. 
Zalmay and White (1999) also acknowledged, but without any analysis, that RMA 
may extend into the medical domain.  
 
The generic nature of the RMA definitions supports analysis of military medical 
advances within the same framework. However, the spirit of interpretation is very 
different. In the traditional sense, RMA generates a step change in the character of 
war that reflects a more effective or efficient means for inflicting human harm. This is 
the polar opposite to the central precept of medicine—primum non nocere, ‘first do 
no harm’. To accommodate this incongruity it is appropriate to extrapolate Gray’s 
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(2006) parsimonious definition to express the concept of a Revolution in Military 
Medical Affairs (RM2A) in a novel way as: 
 
A radical change in the character or practice of military medicine. 
 
1.6 Plotting the revolution 
 
Elinor Sloan (2002, p.24) notes that ‘most RMAs take considerable time to develop, 
even in wartime’. For the DMS it has been a ten-year change process against a 
background of uninterrupted expeditionary operations, with a cluster of step changes 
I have led to transform military trauma care occurring between 1999 and 2009. 
Civilian trauma care marked time in this decade of military change, being repeatedly 
criticised by the Royal College of Surgeons of England (RCSE) and the National 
Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD) for its failings:  
 
‘There is no national strategy for the care of the severely injured…mortality 
varies inexplicably between hospital Trusts.’ 
RCSE, 2000, p.10 
‘The organisation of pre-hospital care, the trauma team response, seniority of 
staff involvement and immediate in-hospital care was found to be deficient in 
many cases.’ 
NCEPOD, 2007, p.8 
 
A strategic drift has resulted whereby DMS concepts, equipment and practices have 
diverged from the NHS baseline to produce a military trauma system that has 
enhanced capability across the Defence Lines of Development when compared with 
civilian peer systems. This drift is plotted on Figure 1.2. Prior to 1999 there was no 
evidence of military system performance, only the presumption that care would fall 
below civilian standards from the DMS’ aspiration in the 1990’s to provide as near 
best NHS practice standards as possible within operational environment constraints. 
Comparable care standards were proven to be achievable in Kosovo in 1999 
(Hodgetts et al 2000, Paper 3): serial innovation predominantly from 2006 has 
created the drift, with military standards diverging from civilian norms to create 
unexpected positive outcomes (Russell, Hodgetts et al, Paper 20). While the focus 
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of this study is on proving transformational change, it is recognised that continuity is 
as important as innovation in many aspects of medicine (for example, in history 
taking and physical examination) and that incremental changes have continued after 
2009. 
 
Figure 1.2: Strategic drift of military and civilian trauma systems 
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Figure 1.3 shows how the principal 20 papers referred to in this thesis contribute to 
the cumulative innovation within the Defence Medical Services that has generated 
the strategic drift in practice and outcome. 
 
Figure 1.3: Cumulative innovation, strategic drift and  
the relationship of thesis literature 
	   28 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Measuring Revolution 
The definitions of RMA and RM2A provide indices against which to judge 
revolutionary change. Whether the advances in combat casualty care I have led span 
all of Lambeth’s components of RMA, and whether the change in character of military 
medicine classifies as a ‘true revolution’ rather than a ‘sub-revolution’, will be 
determined. Eliot Cohen (2009, p.22) described three questions that when tested 
determine whether RMA has occurred, and can be adapted for RM2A to compliment 
the analysis (the text in square brackets represents adaptation):  
 
 “Do military [medical] forces look fundamentally different?”  
 “Are the processes of ‘battle’ different?”  
 “Are [clinical] outcomes different?”  
 
Importantly, Cohen’s approach extends the opportunity for analysis from 
observations of change in ‘character’ (structures, technology) and ‘conduct’ (doctrine, 
processes) to encompass ‘effect’ (clinical outcome). While elements of a traditional 
RMA may be difficult to quantify, such as the impact of enhanced information 
systems on military operational success, clinical outcomes are amenable to rational 
analysis using accepted international metrics (Smith, Hodgetts et al, 2007, Paper 
11). 
 
Nevertheless, an evaluation of RM2A cannot be entirely rational. In some respects 
assessing the impact of changes in combat casualty care is a ‘VUCA’ problem 
(Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous). Evolving weapons of our adversary, and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in particular, produce a future uncertainty of 
injury patterns. In parallel it is arguable, without declaring vulnerability to specified 
mechanisms, that recent success is contingent on certain weapon configurations 
reproducing certain ‘treatable’ injuries—that is, there is an ambiguity of outcome that 
may change as weapons evolve. Change is volatile, and perhaps more accurately 
fragile, because it has been largely confined to military medicine and lacks the 
durability of being embedded in NHS peacetime practice. Complexity is apparent in 
the scope of concept, practice and technology changes that have been implemented 
near-simultaneously, which frustrates the ability to quantify the impact of individual 
innovations. 
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Selection bias in measuring the effect of revolution is accepted as a potential 
limitation of this study. However, proof of RM2A is dependent on positive examples 
that criteria are met, for example an improvement in clinical outcome, which this 
study aims to provide from my published work.  
 
2.2 RM2A Academic Model 
“A working theory is an essential basis for criticism” 
Clausewitz (1832), Book V3 
 
Within the subject period of study I have developed and applied an academic model 
that links parallel strands of development into an overarching model of systemic 
capability enhancement (Figure 2.1). While this model was emergent rather than 
prospective in design, it has engineered the framework that links the complex 
system’s interdependent components. As the evidence for conceptual, doctrinal, 
equipment, practice and clinical governance change will be necessarily evaluated in 
a linear manner, the model provides a strategic appreciation of the multi-dimensional 
dependence and iterative continuous development that occurs within the system. 
  
 
Figure 2.1: RM2A Academic Model 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Clausewitz’s On War was published posthumously in 1832; there are numerous translations. 
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Inputs to the model are medical intelligence4 and continuous analysis of detailed data 
relating to all serious injuries and trauma deaths (post mortem findings) on 
expeditionary operations. These inform research priorities within the Defence 
Scientific and Technical Laboratory (Dstl), which commonly involve animal modeling 
of critical injury. The combined interpretation of intelligence, operational data analysis 
and novel research creates opportunities for concept and doctrine development, 
innovation in clinical equipment, and reduction of future injury risk through 
identification of vulnerabilities in vehicle and personal protective systems. Changes in 
clinical doctrine (guidelines) are reflected in a responsive step-wise curriculum that 
encompasses all acute care interventions from first aid through to field hospital 
resuscitation and enforces new standards of practice prior to deployment. 
Continuous near real-time clinical audit operates as a safety net and supports rapid 
response adjustments to doctrine, training or equipment in the event of any 
unexpected adverse clinical event; it also provides the substrate for detailed clinical 
trend analyses. A raft of core publications that can be dynamically modified supports 
the model in order to distribute the adapting body of knowledge and encourage a 
learning organisation. These publications, where I can claim creation and serial 
incremental development, will be discussed in the body of the thesis. 
 
It is postulated that the system’s detailed feedback and rapid adaptability underpins 
its exemplary performance, and is determined by the ability to develop, control and 
measure (where measurable) all of the model’s components in tandem. There is no 
reliable test of this assertion other than to re-evaluate performance on removing a 
component from the process—and there is no ethical justification to do this. The 
evidence presented for improved outcome will not be attributed to a single 
component or selection of components, but rather to the harmony of the system. This 
is an assumption conditional on the VUCA nature of the analysis. 
 
2.3 The Homunculus Casualty Theorem 
A new theory is proposed and tested in the context of RM2A, the Homunculus 
Casualty Theorem. A homunculus is a distorted body image where proportions relate 
to how the parts of the body are relatively represented within the brain. Analogously, 
injuries and changes in physiology are of unequal importance to a combat casualty’s 
outcome and the importance of treatment of these is therefore also relative (Figure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Medical intelligence in this context comprises deployed clinical experience; scientific papers; grey literature from 
allies; and official body recommendations (NICE, Royal Colleges, professional associations). 
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2.2). This is quite separate from the historical representation of the range of combat 
injury mechanisms (Figure 2.3). What is to be determined is whether my contribution 
has been focused in appropriate proportion on those injuries that are the greatest 
immediate threat to life. This is expressed in the null hypothesis: 
 
Homunculus Casualty Theorem: Null Hypothesis 
The concept, training, equipment and practice changes within the RM2A are not 
correspondingly or proportionately matched in importance to the immediately life-
threatening injuries and physiology of contemporary combat trauma. 
 
Figure 2.2: Homunculus Man and Homunculus Casualty 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Wound Man 
From ‘Feldbuch der Wundartzney’, 1530 
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2.4 Supporting papers 
Twenty papers are selected to support this thesis and are listed in Table 2.1. They 
are referred to as ‘Paper 1’ through ‘Paper 20’ in chronological publication order.  
 
However, to facilitate evaluation of whether a revolutionary transformation has been 
achieved the papers are not considered chronologically, but are grouped and 
evaluated functionally in three chapters conforming to Lambeth’s (1997) definition 
of RMA. The colour codes from Table 1.2 are used to reinforce the functional area to 
which each paper refers: 
 
n Chapter 3: Doctrinal Revolution (new concepts) DOCTRINE 
  
n Chapter 4: Organisational & Operational Revolution 
(systems development, operational innovation and 
organisational adaptation) 
ORGANISATION 
 
OPERATIONS 
  
n Chapter 5: Technological Revolution (new equipment) TECHNOLOGY 
 
Additional material I have published is referenced within the text where it contributes 
to the discourse, without being included as an assessed component of the 
submission: a list of my publications (books, book chapters and peer-reviewed 
papers only) is at Annex A. 
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Serial Paper title Innovation domain 
1 The Paediatric Triage Tape.  Pre-hospital Immediate Care 
1998;2:155-159. 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
2 Battlefield first aid: a simple systematic approach for every 
soldier. Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 1999;145:55-
59. 
OPERATIONS 
3 Lessons from the first operational deployment of emergency 
medicine. Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 
2000;146:134-142. 
ORGANISATION 
4 Training for major incidents: evaluation of perceived ability after 
exposure to a systematic approach. Pre-hospital Immediate 
Care 2000;4:11-16. 
DOCTRINE 
 
5 Incidence, location and reasons for avoidable in-hospital 
cardiac arrest in district general hospital.  Resuscitation 
2002;54:115-123. 
ORGANISATION 
 
6 The identification of risk factors for cardiac arrest and 
formulation of activation criteria to alert a medical emergency 
team. Resuscitation 2002;54:125-131. 
ORGANISATION 
 
7 Care of Civilians during Military operations. International 
Journal of Disaster Medicine 2005;3:3-24. 
ORGANISATION 
 
8 Evaluation of clinician attitudes to the implementation of novel 
haemostatics. Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2005; 
151:139-41. 
TECHNOLOGY 
9 ABC to <CABC>: redefining the military trauma paradigm. 
Emergency Medicine Journal 2006;23:745-746. 
DOCTRINE 
10 Battlefield Advanced Trauma Life Support (Part One). Journal 
of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2006: Suppl to volume 
152(2). 
…and (Part Two): Suppl to volume 152(3). 
…and (Part Three): Suppl to volume 152(4). 
DOCTRINE 
 
 
OPERATIONS 
11 Trauma governance in the UK Defence Medical Services. 
Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2007:153(4);239-242. 
ORGANISATION 
12 Operational Mortality of UK Service Personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: A One-Year Analysis 2006-7. Journal of the Royal 
Army Medical Corps 2007;153(4):252-254. 
ORGANISATION 
13 Combat “Category A” calls: evaluating the pre-hospital 
timelines in a military trauma system. Journal of the Royal 
Army Medical Corps 2007;153(4):266-268. 
OPERATIONS 
14 Tourniquet use in combat trauma: UK military experience. 
Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2007:153(4);310-313. 
TECHNOLOGY 
15 Damage Control Resuscitation. Journal of the Royal Army 
Medical Corps 2007:153(4);299-300. 
DOCTRINE 
16 UK Defence Medical Services guidance for use of recombinant 
Factor VIIa in the deployed military setting. Journal Royal Army 
Medical Corps 2007;153(4):307-9. 
TECHNOLOGY 
17 Benchmarking the UK military deployed trauma system. 
Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 2007;153(4):237-238. 
OPERATIONS 
18 Military Pre-Hospital Care: Why is it different? Journal of the 
Royal Army Medical Corps 2009;155(1):4-10. 
DOCTRINE 
19 The Joint Theatre Clinical Case Conference (JTCCC): Clinical 
governance in action. Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 
2010:156(2);79-83. 
OPERATIONS 
20 The role of trauma scoring in developing trauma clinical 
governance in the Defence Medical Services. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B 2011;366:171-191. 
ORGANISATION 
Table 2.1: Thesis Supporting Papers by Title and Theme 
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Table 2.2 identifies where each paper is referred to (by page number and section 
heading) throughout the text for ease of locating and assessing a specific paper. 
 
 Paper 
Number 
Description Location 
Section headings followed by citations in text [page number] 
 
 1 5.3 [p74]  
 2 3.6 [p45] u 4.6.2 [p59]  
 3 1.6 [p25] u 4.2.1 [p51] u 5.4.1 [p76]  
 4 3.5.3 [p43] u 3.7 [p46]  
 5 4.6.4 [p62]  
 6 4.6.4 [p62]  
 7 5.3 [p74]  
 8 5.2 [p69]  
 9 3.2 [p37][p38] u 3.6 [p45]  
 10 3.4 [p39]  
 11 2.1 [p28] u 4.2.2 [p52]  
 12 4.4 [p55]  
 13 3.6 [p45] u 4.6.2 [p59] u 4.7 [p65]  
 14 3.3 [p38] u 5.1 [p67]  
 15 3.5.1 [p41]  
 16 5.4.2 [p77]  
 17 1.4 [p22] u 3.6 [p45] u 7.1 [p91]  
 18 3.6 [p45]  
 19 4.3 [p54]  
 20 1.4 [p22] u 1.6 [p25] u 4.3 [p54] u 4.6.1 [p58] 
u 4.6.2 [p59] 
 
 
Table 2.2: Paper description locator by section heading and text citation 
 
2.5 Chapter summary 
Part A has provided the purpose of the study to prove a Revolution in Military 
Medical Affairs (RM2A), the background to the proposed revolution and the 
methodology to be employed. 20 of my previously published peer-reviewed papers 
are offered as evidence, reinforced by reference to my additional publications 
including journal articles, books, book chapters and restricted internal reports. 
 
Part B will consider the evidence, following the structured approach outlined, 
summarising in brief and critiquing each of the principal 20 papers. 
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3 Doctrinal revolution 
 
“Theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice points the other way” 
CHARLES CALWELL, 1906, p.70 
 
3.1 Creating new approaches 
 
At the heart of proving transformational change is the innovation in the concepts 
underpinning the practice of combat casualty care. As Calwell points out in the 
context of small wars, when theory and practice are in opposition then the theory 
needs to change (Calwell, 1990). This was the case with the established 
fundamental principles of resuscitation—‘ABC’, or ‘Airway, Breathing and 
Circulation’. Redefinition of the military trauma paradigm can be viewed 
retrospectively as the tipping point in transforming combat casualty care, the point 
after which major changes in training, practice and supporting technology were 
focused around the new priority principle of ‘Catastrophic haemorrhage’ (<C>). This 
was a doctrinal revolution. 
 
3.2 ABC to <C>ABC 
Paper 9 
NEW 
CONCEPT 
Hodgetts T, Mahoney P, Russell M, Byers M. 
ABC to <C>ABC: redefining the military trauma paradigm. 
Emergency Medicine Journal 2006a; 23: 745-6. 
 
 
“There is only one thing more difficult than getting a new idea 
into the military mind, and that is getting an old one out.”  
Sir Basil Liddell Hart 
 
 
ABC had become established since the 1980s as an irrevocable dogma, taught at 
every level of resuscitation from first-aider to hospital consultant, and reinforced 
through the national civilian training programmes of Advanced Trauma Life Support 
(American College of Surgeons, 2008) and Advanced Life Support (UK Resuscitation 
Council, 2008). Yet military experience was that ABC was counter-intuitive. For the 
soldier who has lost his legs to an improvised explosive device (IED), is conscious 
and is in severe pain, the highest priority is to immediately stop further bleeding—
otherwise he will rapidly succumb to massive blood loss. What would appear 
Paper	  10	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common sense was supported by Vietnam experience, which identified that 
haemorrhage from injured limbs was the most important cause of avoidable 
battlefield death (Champion et al, 2003).  
 
In 2006 the British military followed my recommendations, broke with the civilian 
doctrinal standard and introduced the concept of <C>ABC (Hodgetts et al, 2006a; 
Paper 9), where <C> stands for ‘catastrophic haemorrhage’. The strategist JFC 
Fuller called doctrine ‘common sense…that is action adapted to circumstance’ 
(British Army 2010), which chimes with the rationale for change. This should not, 
therefore, have been a surprise: it is actually a disappointment that it took so long to 
realise the lessons from previous conflict and to have the organisational courage to 
deviate from a civilian norm.  
 
3.3 The Tourniquet Controversy 
What was surprising was the internal resistance to this change, specifically from 
military orthopaedic surgeons who argued that tourniquets in the military setting were 
unsafe, contributed to morbidity (unnecessary limb loss) and had no effect on 
improving outcome (Parker et al, 2007). I defended the organisational position 
(Hodgetts et al, 2007b) and the body of subsequent international evidence has 
strongly confirmed the contribution of tourniquets to saving soldiers’ lives (Brodie, 
Hodgetts et al, 2007; Kragh et al 2011). UK evidence (Paper 14) is discussed in 
Section 5, Technology Revolution. 
 
Of strategic importance was that a superficially simplistic conceptual change had 
profound effects on the structure and content of all training programmes from 
individual first aid for every soldier (Hodgetts 2007f) through to collective pre-
deployment training for the field hospital, and the enhancement in equipment at all 
levels of the evacuation chain. 
 
The <C>ABC conceptual change alone can be argued to meet Lambeth’s (1997) 
precepts of a revolution and fulfils Cohen’s (2009) requirement to demonstrate a 
change in the processes of ‘battle’. How I anchored this change through 
incorporation into pan-organisational clinical doctrine publications is described in 
Section 3.4. Importantly, <C>ABC was only one of a range of new concepts I 
introduced to support transformation: the wider concepts are described in Sections 
3.5-7.  
Paper	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3.4 Anchoring doctrinal changes  
 
Paper 10 
NEW 
CONCEPTS 
Hodgetts T, Mahoney P, Evans G, Brooks A (eds). 
Battlefield Advanced Trauma Life Support (Part One). 
JR Army Med Corps 2006c: Suppl to volume 152(2). 
…and (Part Two): Suppl to volume 152(3). 
…and (Part Three): Suppl to volume 152(4). 
 
Clinical doctrine, in the sense of ‘practice that is believed, understood and taught’ 
(British Army 2010), was codified in the 1980s within Casualty Treatment Regimes 
(CTRs—a field aide memoire) and the Battlefield Advanced Trauma Life Support 
(BATLS) course manual. CTRs fell out of use in the 1990s as they were not updated 
and therefore lacked enduring clinical validity. The BATLS course manual was 
regularly revised and the 2006 edition (Hodgetts et al, 2006b; reproduced as journal 
supplements 2006c-e, Paper 10) launched the <C>ABC and other resuscitation 
concepts. The principal conceptual changes in BATLS are shown in Table 3.1.   
 
The introduction of <C>ABC coincided with a step change in how the BATLS course 
was delivered, recognising that the previous educational approach of ‘one size fits all’ 
did not match the ground truth. The manual emphasised the difference in approach 
throughout ‘4 Stages of Resuscitation’—Care Under Fire, Tactical Field Care, Field 
Resuscitation and Advanced Resuscitation. Further, it introduced the concepts of a 
truncated clinical assessment in a semi-permissive environment (the Tactical Rapid 
Primary Survey, TRaPs) and a standardised patient summary (the ‘MIST Message’—
Mechanism, Injuries, Signs, Treatment). MIST has become anchored in broader 
military culture as it has been adopted within the NATO standardised message 
requesting casualty evacuation on operations. 
 
However, a gap still existed to provide comprehensive guidance across the full scope 
of military medicine. In 2007, Clinical Guidelines for Operations (CGOs) were 
released, which used the <C>ABC concept as a common root and the start point for 
every emergency in medicine (Hodgetts 2007e). This was a further diversion from 
civilian practice, which compartmentalises how an emergency is approached in terms 
of trauma, cardiac, environmental, toxicology (poisons, including radiation and 
chemical agents) and paediatrics. Uniquely, the military concept of CGOs facilitates 
cross-boundary clinical problem solving: it was distributed by the Development 
Paper	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Concepts and Doctrine Centre (Hodgetts 2008a) and is supported by a process for 
regular updates. 
 
Old BATLS Concepts (<2005) New BATLS Concepts (≥2006) 
ABC 
AIRWAY-BREATHING-CIRCULATION 
<C>ABC 
CATASTROPHIC HAEMORRHAGE-AIRWAY-
BREATHING-CIRCULATION 
…and new equipment to support 
<C>ABC concept: 
§      - Elastic field dressing 
§      - Topical haemostatics 
§      - Commercial tourniquet 
‘Haemostasis Ladder’ 
CONCEPT FOR STEPWISE USE OF NEW 
EQUIPMENT / TECHNIQUES: INTRODUCED AS 
CHANGE BETWEEN 2005 & 2008 EDITIONS 
Single approach to resuscitation 4-stage resuscitation: 
§      - Care Under Fire (CUF) 
§      - Tactical Field Care (TFC) 
§      - Field Resuscitation 
§      - Advanced Resuscitation 
Primary Survey Tailored Primary Survey 
§      - CUF: assess <C>A only 
§      - TFC: Tactical Rapid Primary Survey 
§      - Field & Advanced Resuscitation: full 
§        Primary Survey 
Casualty reporting: no standard Casualty reporting: MIST message 
MIST HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN INCORPORATED 
NOT ONLY INTO PATIENT HANDOVER AT 
SUCCESSIVE LEVELS OF CARE, BUT INTO 
STANDARD NATO 9-LINE REPORT TO REQUEST 
EVACUATION HELICOPTER AT SCENE 
Crystalloid fluid resuscitation 
HARTMANN’S SOLUTION OR NORMAL SALINE 
Early blood product resuscitation 
RED CELLS AND PLASMA (2008 REVISION OF 
MANUAL) 
Hypotensive resuscitation 
FLUID JUST ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN RADIAL PULSE 
‘Novel hybrid’ resuscitation 
FLUID JUST ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN RADIAL PULSE 
FOR FIRST HOUR THEN FLUID TO RESTORE 
NORMAL BLOOD PRESSURE 
Cut-down as a technique of failure 
WHEN PERIPHERAL CANNULATION FAILS 
Intraosseous as a technique of failure 
WHEN PERIPHERAL CANNULA FAILS OR 1ST 
CHOICE IN CARDIAC ARREST 
Common skills for all providers (doctors, 
nurses, medics) 
Skills tailored for level of clinical 
competence 
 
Table 3.1: Principal conceptual changes in  
Battlefield Advanced Trauma Life Support 
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3.5 Wider conceptual innovation in trauma  
3.5.1 Damage Control Resuscitation 
Paper 15 
NEW 
CONCEPT 
Hodgetts T, Mahoney P, Kirkman E, Midwinter M.  
Damage Control Resuscitation.  
JR Army Med Corps 2007c; 153(4): 299-300. 
 
Although the change to <C>ABC represents a paradigm shift in medical practice at 
all levels of provider, it is subordinate to the new concept of Damage Control 
Resuscitation (DCR) that Hodgetts et al (2007c, p.299) define as: 
  
“A systemic approach to major trauma combining the <C>ABC (catastrophic 
bleeding, air way, breathing, circulation) paradigm with a series of clinical 
techniques from point of wounding to definitive treatment in order to minimise 
blood loss, maximise tissue oxygenation and optimise outcome.” 
 
The purpose of introducing this concept was to draw together a series of innovations 
in equipment and practice into a coherent doctrine that would both assist in medical 
planning and introduce a more comprehensive ‘currency’ of acute trauma capability, 
be it for combat casualty care or civilian trauma. Damage Control Surgery (DCS, my 
emphasis) has emerged as ‘best practice’ for the critically injured patient from North 
American experience of civilian trauma (Moore et al 1998). The precepts of DCS are 
a trilogy of: 
 
n A time-limited operation (primary surgery), recognising that the patient’s 
commonly deranged physiology (acidosis, coagulopathy, hypothermia) will 
not tolerate prolonged surgery;  
n Intensive care to correct coagulopathy, hypovoalemia [and related acidosis], 
and hypothermia—the ‘lethal triad’ (Blackbourne et al 2008); 
n Secondary surgery when the patient’s physiology is stabilised. 
 
DCR recognises that active measures to stop bleeding and treat coagulopathy are 
started in the pre-hospital setting in our military treatment model for critical injury. 
This potentially ameliorates the severity of physiological derangement previously 
encountered during primary surgery, extends the window of opportunity during 
primary surgery and reduces the challenge of the lethal triad on Intensive Care. 
Collectively, this would be expected to improve survival and evidence of this is 
Paper	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presented in Section 4, Organisational Revolution. DCR has been falsely interpreted 
by some planners to offer resource savings—just as DCS is a time-limited operation, 
it has been interpreted that DCR is a truncated resuscitation. In fact, the opposite is 
true as to deliver DCR requires a more sophisticated trauma system that can project 
technology to the point of wounding (tourniquets, haemostatic dressings—see 
Section 5, Technology Revolution) and provide blood products in the pre-hospital 
setting. 
 
3.5.2 Haemostatic Resuscitation & Right Turn Resuscitation 
Linked to the organisational consolidation of DCR as the guiding trauma resuscitation 
precept are the concepts of Haemostatic Resuscitation (Kirkman, Watts, Hodgetts et 
al, 2007) and Right Turn Resuscitation (Hettiaratchy, Tai, Mahoney, Hodgetts 2010). 
Haemostatic Resuscitation recognises the direct relationship between coagulopathy 
and mortality and defines a new optimum approach to blood product replacement 
therapy that more aggressively addresses coagulopathy. Again, this is more 
resource demanding as the central tenet is an increase in the use of plasma—with a 
change in the ratio of red cells to plasma transfused from 4:1 to 1:1.  
 
Right Turn Resuscitation represents a reconfiguration of how teams work together at 
the field hospital in order to improve outcome—the critically injured are taken directly 
from the helicopter into the operating theatre, where Emergency Medicine, Surgery 
and Radiology teams conduct complex resuscitation in parallel. Conceptually, the 
change is from a 2-dimensional, vertical approach to surgical resuscitation to a 3-
dimensional, horizontal and concurrent approach (Hodgetts 2011, unpublished: 
Figures 3.1-3.2). Further, it emphases the precept that “Surgery does not follow 
resuscitation, it is part of resuscitation” (Hodgetts, Turner 2006f). 
 
All of these conceptual innovations, translated into clinical doctrine, fulfil Lambeth’s 
criteria for revolution. In addition, by influencing equipment (diagnostic, monitoring, 
treatment) and the training and organisation of clinical teams, they are meeting the 
Toffler (1993) criteria for a ‘true revolution’.  
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Figure 3.1: 2-D Resuscitation 
[ED = Emergency Department; OR = Operating Room] 
 
 
Figure 3.2: 3-D Resuscitation 
[ED = Emergency Department; OR = Operating Room] 
 
3.5.3 Trauma heuristics 
New concepts can be communicated as heuristics—a ‘rule of thumb’ that acts as a 
mnemonic, and is presented as an acronym or memorable phrase. The development 
and propagation of a raft of heuristics in trauma, resuscitation, and disaster 
management has been a substantial contribution to conceptual innovation in this field 
(Trauma Rules, Hodgetts et al 1997 & 2006; Resuscitation Rules, Hodgetts and 
Castle 1999; Disaster Rules, Russell, Hodgetts et al 2010). This approach to 
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simplify complex situations in order to provide a framework to act has Clausewitzian5 
origins: 
 
 
 
“Everything in war is simple, but even the simplest thing is 
difficult.”  
Clausewitz, On War (1832) 
 
Nevertheless, Clausewitz highlighted that simple systems did not take account of 
complexities and what really matters is experience to make difficult decisions: 
 
 
 
 
 
“Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct of war with 
principles, rules or even systems. This did present a positive 
goal, but people failed to take adequate account of the endless 
complexities involved.” 
“Only the experienced officer will make the right decision…at 
every pulse beat of war. Practice and experience dictate the 
answer.” 
Clausewitz, On War (1832) 
 
The counter-argument is that in a clinical crisis, where the NHS Trauma Team 
Leader is commonly inexperienced (NCEPOD 2007), it is the complexity itself that is 
paralysing. This is amplified in the unfamiliar setting of a ‘major incident’, given that 
most clinicians have no previous exposure and little or no structured training 
(Hodgetts 2000b—Paper 4, Section 3.7; Hodgetts 2003). Rules provide the initial 
framework around which medical commanders can improvise and the co-ordinating 
structure in extreme confusion around which professionals can rally. The difference 
with war is that everything is uncertain in war—but in a ‘simple’, ‘compensated’ major 
incident uncertainty can be relatively quickly transformed into certainty, and the 
emergency services can gain progressive control of the situation. The major incident 
response is effectively a unilateral action, rather than war’s characteristic continuous 
interaction of opposites. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Carl von Clausewitz was a 19th Century Prussian military strategist whose landmark treatise On War (1832) is still 
studied by contemporary Army Officers.  
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Nevertheless, personal experience of successive major incidents6 from 1988 to 2009 
has resulted in a shift in mind-set from rigidly following a system to flexibly adapting 
the approach on each occasion—this is consistent with Clausewitz’s view of “military 
genius”, which relates to deep experience and intuition, and which “rises above all 
rules”. For the lesser experienced, a systematic approach is still endorsed. 
 
3.6 Conceptual differences in military pre-hospital care  
Paper 18 
NEW 
CONCEPTS 
Hodgetts T, Mahoney P.  
Military Pre-hospital Care: Why is it Different?  
JR Army Med Corps 2009; 155(1): 4-10. 
 
The importance of identifying conceptual differences in military versus civilian pre-
hospital care lies with managing expectations of transferring excellent outcomes from 
the contemporary military operational environment to the civilian home base in the 
UK. A principal difference is that care is embedded at the point of wounding in the 
military (every soldier is taught and tested on first aid at least once annually—
Hodgetts 1999, Paper 2) and treatment starts almost immediately: there is an 
inherent delay in the civilian setting to call an ambulance. Every soldier has their own 
equipment (dressing, tourniquet, morphine) and a minimum of 1 in 4 soldiers has 
advanced training and equipment—the average time for this ‘Team Medic’ to start 
treatment is currently 2 minutes after injury (Hodgetts & Findlay, 2012a). 
 
Military trauma differs vastly in its mechanism (blast & ballistic > blunt) compared to 
civilian trauma and is statistically more severe, p<0.0001 (Hodgetts 2007a, Paper 
17). This influences the conceptual approach adopted (<C>ABC versus ABC, Paper 
9) the shortened target timelines to initial surgery (McLeod & Hodgetts 2007h, 
Paper 13), and the paradigm of aggressive management of coagulopathy that starts 
in the pre-hospital setting. 
 
Contemporary military pre-hospital care involves a physician-led team delivered by 
helicopter and providing advanced resuscitation in-flight: on scene times average 
only 2 minutes because of the hostile environment. The concept is therefore one of 
‘scoop and play’, which is not seen in the civilian setting (‘scoop and run’ when there 
are limited skills or ‘stay and play’ with advanced interventions). This, combined with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Hospital Evacuations for terrorist bomb threats, Hannover 1998-9; IRA bombing of Musgrave Park Hospital 1991; 
operational experience in Kosovo, Oman, Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan 1999-2009 (war fighting and post-conflict).  
Paper	  10	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direct admission to the operating theatre on arrival, supports the achievement of 
surgery within the ‘Golden Hour’ (Cowley 1976). While reduced time to surgery can 
be claimed to underpin the excellent outcomes it is harder to quantify the difference 
that an experienced pre-hospital doctor makes. Paper 18 (Hodgetts and Mahoney, 
2009) summarises attempts to do this, recognising the limitation of self-reporting 
post-incident of value added, but quantifying the cases where a physician-only 
intervention was undertaken (anaesthesia; thoracotomy; ketamine or fentanyl 
analgesia) and procedures where physician judgment could influence whether there 
was a balance of benefit for skills to be undertaken (surgical airway, chest drain). 
215/595 (36%) of cases fitted these criteria. This paper predates the widespread use 
of blood and plasma given by a physician on the helicopter, which is now a critical 
component in the early management of the coagulopathy of trauma (Kirkman et al 
2007). Objective evidence for physician impact has been one of the organisation’s 
most pressing needs while working in an environment of multi-national pre-hospital 
care provision in Afghanistan, where different standards of pre-hospital care produce 
substantial friction.  
 
3.7 Concepts for multiple casualty management  
Paper 4 
NEW 
CONCEPTS 
Hodgetts T. 
Training for major incidents: evaluation of perceived ability after 
exposure to a systematic approach. 
Pre-hospital Immediate Care 2000c; 4: 11-16. 
 
Prior to 1992 there was no systematic approach to the management of multiple 
casualty incidents. The catalyst for developing this was the IRA bombing of the 
military wing of Musgrave Park Hospital, Belfast, on 2 November 1991. In the 
incident I acted as the Medical Commander, improvising a Casualty Clearing Station 
and coordinating the evacuation of in-patients and the treatment of the injured 
(Hodgetts 1993). This led directly to co-development of the Major Incident Medical 
Management and Support (MIMMS) programme in partnership with the Advanced 
Life Support Group in Manchester (Hodgetts and Mackway-Jones 1995a). The first 
MIMMS course ran in Manchester in 1993—within one year it had been 
internationalised and was established as a standard in Australia. It has subsequently 
been adopted widely in Europe (Sweden, Netherlands, Italy), Asia (India, Japan), the 
Middle East (Qatar) and South Africa. In 2004 the military version became the NATO 
standard. The core new concepts introduced are summarised in Table 3.2. 
Paper	  10	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New Concept Description / Comment 
OVERARCHING CONCEPT 
‘CSCATTT’: a simple, systematic 
approach that can be applied to any 
multiple casualty incident and has cross-
boundary utility (national boundaries and 
the civil-military boundary) 
Command, Safety, Communications, 
Assessment, Triage, Treatment and 
Transport 
COMMAND 
‘Bronze-Silver-Gold’ tiers of command 
Adopted from Police, but not in use by 
health services prior to MIMMS 
SAFETY 
‘1-2-3 of Safety’ 
Prioritised safety of (1) Self, (2) the 
Scene and (3) the Survivors 
COMMUNICATION 
‘METHANE’ message 
Major Incident Standby/Declared; Exact 
location; Hazards; Access; 
Number/severity of casualties; 
Emergency services present & required 
WAS ‘ETHANE’ IN 1ST EDITION; WIDELY ADOPTED 
BY UK MILITARY DURING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 
COMMUNICATION 
‘Cross of Communication’ 
Understanding of the horizontal 
communication/liaison requirements 
TRIAGE 
‘Triage Sieve’ 
A simple physiological system of triage 
for all providers 
USED FOR EVERY SOLDIER IN BRITISH ARMY 
FROM 1998; TAUGHT TO UK FIREFIGHTERS AND 
POLICE; INCREMENTAL CHANGE TO DEVELOP 
CHEMICAL TRIAGE AND PAEDIATRIC TRIAGE 
VARIANTS 
TRIAGE 
‘Triage Sort’ 
A more sophisticated physiological 
system of triage for healthcare providers 
 
Table 3.2: New Concepts Developed for the MIMMS Course 
 
In addition to new concepts, MIMMS introduced individual skills to enhance 
performance at an incident (radio communications practice using the standardised 
METHANE format; practice on simulated casualties of both the Triage Sieve and the 
Triage Sort. Scene performance was further supported by a waterproof aide memoire 
(Hodgetts et al 1995b; Hodgetts and Porter 2002a).  
 
Evaluation of perceived ability after attending the MIMMS course was undertaken by 
pre-course and post-course questionnaires, validated for content and designed to 
exclude response bias (Hodgetts 2000, Paper 4). There were 100% returns. Only 
59% of candidates had received any pre-course training in disaster management, 
and only 25% of doctors with prior training agreed that it was adequate. 100% of 
candidates agreed post-course that MIMMS provided adequate training.  
 
This was a small study (n=41 candidates questioned) and is illustrative. Greater 
reliability of the results could be obtained with a larger cohort. Statistical analysis to 
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determine the significance of attitudinal change (e.g. Fisher’s Exact Test) would also 
add value even with a small sample. It is important to be able to validate an 
individual’s perceived ability to perform in a disaster with their actual ability during a 
disaster and to map whether the principles and skills taught have genuine practical 
application. The unpredictability of disasters, their relative rarity and their global 
distribution have meant there is still no substantial educational research to prove 
this—rather, anecdote has reinforced taught practice or stimulated incremental 
change (e.g. serial modification of the Triage Sieve algorithm). 
 
3.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has described a series of new concepts introduced over 10 years that 
contribute to the body of medical knowledge and have transformed combat casualty 
care practice. Collectively they have changed the ‘rules of the game’, requiring new 
doctrine, military tactics, and medical techniques to be developed.  
 
In the next chapter attention is turned to how the Defence Medical Services has 
learned lessons from its deployments and reorganised to optimise the delivery of 
combat casualty care from point of injury to rehabilitation. Additionally, systems of 
information management are explored that have been developed to serially 
improve—and indeed transform—operational performance. 
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4. Organisational & Operational Revolution 
4.1 Setting the conditions for transformation 
If it is accepted that new concepts and doctrine have been introduced it needs to be 
determined whether these are because of, or in spite of, organisational restructuring 
and novel processes. Following the Strategic Defence Review in 1998 (SDR ’98) 
there was substantial reorganisation of DMS management structures, with enhanced 
centralised co-ordination of single Service medical components under the Surgeon 
General (MOD 1998). Bernard Loo (2009) highlights the tendency to represent 
transformation as a top-down rather than a bottom-up process: it would be a 
convenient interpretation to causally link revised management structures to improved 
clinical outcomes—but this cannot be assumed. It demands supporting evidence, 
which can be drawn from the formation of the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine 
(RCDM). 
 
The Centre for Defence Medicine [sic] was opened in 2001 in Birmingham, receiving 
its Royal Charter in 2002. At its theoretical inception within SDR ’98 it was visualised 
to be a: 
 
“…centre of excellence…for operational and battlefield medical research and 
advanced thinking…and…dedicated training of the highest quality.”  
(HCDC 1999, p.xxiii) 
 
Importantly, RCDM provided the infrastructure for military academic departments to 
develop. Central to driving the changes in concepts, doctrine, training, equipment 
and governance in combat casualty care described in this thesis has been the work 
of the Academic Department of Military Emergency Medicine (ADMEM) at RCDM. It 
is reasonable to deduce that without the formation of RCDM there would have been 
a less optimal environment for academic innovation and change would at best have 
been slower, but more realistically less comprehensive. So organisational 
restructuring can be claimed to be essential in supporting the clinical developments 
that have transformed performance. However, it would be false to claim central 
strategic direction for the academic innovations, which arose de novo within the 
departments in response to deep understanding (through repeated operational 
deployments) of the clinical-academics. In this sense, changes to training and clinical 
practice have been driven middle-down. Conversely, changes to equipment and 
policy have been informed from the middle-up, although have been progressively 
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driven from the top-down as both the intensity of casualties and the enduring nature 
of operations in Afghanistan have developed—and public, media and Ministerial 
attention has encouraged central direction. 
 
Although RCDM was established as an alma mater for military clinical-academics it 
has evolved following war-fighting in Iraq in 2003 to be the principal receiving 
hospital for UK operational casualties. This has created opportunity for further 
management restructuring, with Defence recognition of the military ‘Role 4’ concept 
(that is, the need for a military framework of support within the NHS hospital 
designated for definitive care, linked with seamless continuity of care for those 
discharged to a military rehabilitation facility)7 co-ordinated by a Standing Joint 
Commander Medical. Porter (2012) describes the transformation of Role 4 in detail, 
to include changes in military manpower, clinical capacity to handle ventilated 
casualties, process change to accommodate increased operating theatre 
requirements, and an improved multidisciplinary management approach to complex 
cases. In addition, SDR ’98 stimulated an enhancement of the Army’s ambulance 
evacuation capability and created an additional 800 Field Hospital beds. Collectively, 
the structural changes to the organisation satisfy Cohen’s (2009) first rule of 
revolutionary change—that the forces must look fundamentally different. 
 
4.2 Information as a performance-transforming enabler 
The co-location of the military academic and operational casualty treatment 
components in Birmingham has also facilitated the development of a comprehensive 
clinical information management system to transform quality assurance. Descriptions 
of a traditional RMA focus on the information revolution. Lawrence Freedman (1998) 
postulates that information dominance is at the heart of the contemporary revolution, 
with the emphasis on gathering, processing and near-real time distribution to 
commanders. He notes that human judgement may be necessary, which incurs a 
time penalty. Further, he recognises that high quality information does not guarantee 
high quality interpretation, nor does high quality interpretation guarantee high quality 
decisions. How then do these observations on information management in the non-
medical military operational context relate to how an information revolution can 
transform clinical performance? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The military medical Roles are defined at Annex B. 
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The simple answer is that the principles of information management are generic. 
Prior to 1997 the DMS did not collect data that allowed a comparison of trauma 
system performance: the aim of DMS was to provide ‘as near NHS best practice as 
achievable within operational constraints’, with the inherent assumption that 
deployed care fell below the standard of NHS care. 
 
4.2.1 The Military Trauma Registry: first steps 
Paper 3 
ORGANISATION 
(GOVERNANCE) 
Hodgetts T, Kenward G, Masud S.  
Lessons from the first operational deployment of emergency 
medicine. JR Army Med Corps 2000a; 146: 134-42. 
 
In 1997 I established a trauma registry in Frimley Park Hospital, a combined NHS 
and military hospital, following an Australian model. The aim was to improve the 
holistic care of all seriously injured patients presenting to the hospital. This model 
was transposed to the British field hospital in Kosovo in 1999 (Hodgetts et al, 1999; 
Hodgetts et al 2000a, Paper 3) and a direct comparison was made retrospectively of 
NHS versus DMS system performance using recognised international models 
(Wesson’s criteria). Performance was effectively the same in both environments 
(Table 4.1), with some improved indicators in the field hospital (seniority within the 
trauma team; time to surgery) and some impaired indicators in the field (time to CT). 
Importantly, performance in the civilian hospital was shown to dip in the period that 
continuous audit and governance were suspended while trauma audit staff were in 
Kosovo (Hodgetts et al 2000b): the dip was from a peak annual system performance 
of 85.3% judged by Wesson’s criteria (1998-1999) to 68.0% coinciding with the 
suspension of audit (1999-2000). 
 
Wesson’s Criteria 
This is salvageable major trauma patients who survived [SS] ÷  
salvageable patients who survived & died [SS +SD] x 100 
 
That is:     [SS] ÷ [SS + SD] x 100 
 
A salvageable major trauma patient is one with ISS 16-59 
Kosovo Field Hospital, 1999:                 84.6% 
 
Frimley Park Hospital, 1998-1999:        85.3% 
 
Notes: Frimley Park Hospital performance dipped to 68.0% during 1999-2000 while military audit staff were in Kosovo. 
           A ‘major trauma’ patient is defined as having an Injury Severity Score (ISS) ≥16. 
 
Table 4.1: Comparative Performance of a Field Hospital and an NHS Hospital 
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The importance of Paper 3 is that it was the first published objective evidence of 
modern military trauma system effectiveness; it established the benchmark that 
military operational care was at least as good as NHS care for major trauma; and it 
set the standard for all subsequent data collection during the Iraq (2003-2009) and 
Afghanistan (2001-date) conflicts, raising the expectations for detailed analysis of 
system performance. Further, it highlighted the limitations of civilian-oriented trauma 
scoring systems, with the requirement to capture the ‘New’ Injury Severity Score 
(Osler et al 1997) alongside the traditional Injury Severity Score if prediction of 
mortality (and therefore prediction of system performance) was to be truly 
representative. Perhaps most importantly, as the first operational deployment of 
Emergency Medicine as a specialty its role and reputation was sharply established 
and the conditions were set to lead transformational change in doctrine, training and 
equipment. This was the true birth of the combat casualty care revolution and the 
catalyst for a decade of sustained change.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Kosovo Field Hospital—the catalyst for revolution 
[Colonel Hodgetts in centre] 
 
4.2.2 Refining the Military Trauma Registry 
The military’s trauma audit programme was transferred to Birmingham on 
establishment of RCDM in summer 2001. The events of ‘9-11’ later that year set the 
conditions for two major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and a new focus on 
Birmingham to provide the definitive treatment to the war injured: this directly led to 
the development of the scope and sophistication of the trauma registry, which was 
	   53 
matched with supporting human resources as the organisation’s dependence on the 
output has grown (a dependence, that is, to prove clinical effectiveness and provide 
reliable epidemiology in the public interest). To reflect the sources of injured patient 
data from all UK expeditionary operational areas since 2003, it was renamed the 
Joint Theatre Trauma Registry (JTTR).  
 
Paper 11 
ORGANISATION 
(GOVERNANCE) 
Smith J, Hodgetts T, Mahoney P, Russell R, Davies S et al. 
Trauma governance in the UK Defence Medical Services.  
JR Army Med Corps 2007; 153(4): 239-42. 
 
JTTR is fundamentally a quality assurance system designed to detect unexpected 
outcomes (unexpected survivors, unexpected deaths, complications, emerging new 
injury patterns and adverse events) in order to maintain and develop standards of 
care (Smith, Hodgetts et al 2007, Paper 11). A team of Trauma Nurse Co-ordinators 
collects detailed prescribed information during resuscitation, surgery and intensive 
care in the field hospital; this is collated with the patient’s pre-hospital record and 
interventions and outcomes from their continuing Role 4 care8 in UK. Compliance 
with pre-determined key performance indicators (KPIs) allows system weaknesses to 
be identified, remedial education to be put in place and the impact on improved 
performance to be measured—this is the MACE Cycle (Major Trauma Audit for 
Clinical Effectiveness, Figure 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The MACE Cycle and a MACE Operational Report 
 
The scope and depth of the continuous audit has been unmatched in UK civilian 
practice: in 2000 it was praised by the Commission for Health Improvement as an 
example of best practice (Hodgetts et al 2000a) and again in 2009 by its successor, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The military medical Roles are defined at Annex B. 
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the Healthcare Commission (HCC, 2009). JTTR is not designed as an electronic 
health record or a patient tracking system, although there are features of both these 
functions—organisational expectations have had to be managed when these 
functions have been demanded. A serendipitous benefit has been the ability to link 
patterns of injury with both the protective clothing worn and the seating position in a 
vehicle: this has identified specific vulnerabilities to be actively pursued within the 
Defence research and development programme (see Section 4.5).  
 
4.3 Formalising and systematising clinical feedback 
Paper 19 
OPERATIONS 
(FEEDBACK) 
Willdridge D, Hodgetts T, Mahoney P, Jarvis L.  
The Joint Theatre Clinical Case Conference: clinical governance in 
action. J Roy Army Med Corps 2010; 156(2): 79-83. 
 
Critical patient safety events in the deployed setting will now prompt remedial action 
through the chain of command within 24 hours. Otherwise, the principal driver for 
clinical change is the near-real time feedback provided during a weekly telephone 
conference. I established this Joint Theatre Clinical Case Conference (JTCCC) while 
in Afghanistan in 2007; subsequently, JTCCC has been chaired and strictly 
controlled through RCDM.9  
 
 
Figure 4.3: JTCCC in progress in a field hospital (Afghanistan 2007) 
[Colonel Hodgetts in centre] 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I chaired JTCCC and managed the associated change continuously for the first 2 years. 
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JTCCC involves every stakeholder in the care pathway from primary retrieval through 
to rehabilitation with over-watch by the Surgeon General’s Department (SGD) and 
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). This inclusivity encourages high quality 
interpretation and consensus clinical decision-making by the subject matter experts, 
tested against policy and operational realities by the SGD and PJHQ. In an analysis 
of JTCCC effectiveness over 14 months, a wide range of clinical and non-clinical 
(equipment, policy, training) issues were identified with 68% (109/160) resolved 
within 3 weeks—training gaps were particularly rapidly addressed, with all issues 
closed within 3 weeks. JTCCC has become one of the main assets in progressively 
improving outcome, which is consistent with the independent analysis of the major 
trauma audit process rated by the Healthcare Commission as ‘excellent’ (HCC 2009). 
This supports Cohen’s (2009) second criterion for evidence of revolutionary 
change—a demonstrable difference in the processes of ‘battle’.    
 
Criticisms of JTCCC have been its exclusivity to tracking progress of UK casualties 
(only half of the activity of the field hospital) and its exclusivity to trauma. Combat 
injuries have emotional currency with politicians and the public, but they are only a 
portion of the total patients evacuated from an operational setting—other patients are 
collectively identified as “disease or non-battle injury” (DNBI).  The same depth of 
audit has not been undertaken for disease (although any serious non-battle injury is 
still audited), as ‘disease’ has lacked the clinical championship of a physician to 
establish and manage this process. However, outline epidemiology has been 
achievable after I introduced and led development of the increasingly sophisticated 
Operational Emergency Department Attendance Register, with continuous data 
collection from the 2003 Iraq conflict onwards (Russell, Hodgetts et al 2007; Russell, 
Hodgetts et al 2011, Paper 20; Ollerton, Hodgetts et al 2007; Ollerton and 
Hodgetts 2010). 
 
4.4 A new framework of peer review   
The development of human judgement that Freedman (1998) refers to in his analysis 
of the components of an RMA is particularly pertinent to the peer review panels 
established at RCDM to evaluate the number and reasons for unexpected survival, 
and to analyse every operational trauma death. These panels give the organisation a 
level of scrutiny and systemic rigour that is unmatched by civilian comparator 
institutions. To determine why is to begin to understand the differences in culture and 
organisation between the NHS and the DMS.  
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Military clinicians are conditioned differently. They are bonded morally by a common 
purpose to treat soldiers and psychologically by shared intense experiences (a 
shared threat to their lives, and shared clinical horrors). When coupled with the 
physical requirement on operations to live together in a confined space this generally 
makes the clinicians pull as a single team. This culture continues in the academic 
environment, enhanced by the juxtaposition of all the Defence Professors. It 
stimulates daily cross-boundary academic interaction, which is unusual within a 
university framework. 
 
Paper 12 
ORGANISATION 
(GOVERNANCE) 
Hodgetts T, Davies S, Midwinter M, Russell R, Smith J et al. 
Operational mortality of UK Service personnel in Iraq and 
Afghanistan: a one-year analysis 2006-7.  
JR Army Med Corps 2007d; 153(4): 252-4. 
 
Academic analysis of every operational death has been undertaken since 2004, with 
systematic peer review since 2006 (Hodgetts et al 2007d, Paper 12). The panel is 
multidisciplinary and the principal objective is to codify casualties as 
‘salvageable/non-salvageable’ (the likelihood that surgical intervention would be 
attempted and the predicted influence on survival) and ‘preventable/unpreventable’ 
(the likelihood that intervention was possible given the tactical circumstances and 
resources). This provides a continuous organisational barometer of performance and 
alerts the command chain to any unexpected death, coupled with an analysis of the 
reasons. This is a more sensitive indicator of system performance than the crude 
historical ratio of ‘Killed In Action’ to ‘Died of Wounds’, which can misinterpret an 
improved survival to hospital of non-salvageable injury as poor hospital care.  
 
Further, the analysis demonstrates differences in injury patterns between both 
contemporary and historical conflict environments. For example, a higher incidence 
of hostile action death due to blast and fragmentation in Iraq vs Afghanistan (76% vs 
57%) and more gunshot wound (GSW) deaths in Afghanistan vs Iraq (43% vs 
24%)—yet the historical dominance of sepsis deaths from WW2 was not seen. The 
importance is to retain the ability to rapidly recognise these differences and to be 
flexible to adapt campaign-specific solutions to prevention (tactics and protective 
equipment) and treatment (novel clinical approaches).  
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The National Audit Office independently verified that there are a very small number 
of deaths that are considered avoidable on contemporary operations (NAO 2010). 
Nevertheless, as an early ‘adverse weather warning’ and quality assurance safety 
net an experienced clinician attends every military post mortem. This has been 
valuable in identifying sub-optimal practice, such as non-therapeutic placement of a 
drain or infusion device, and has regularly prompted immediate remedial action to 
amend training, policy or procurement direction.10 It is a clearly transferable practice 
to a civilian trauma system. 
 
4.5 New relationships to stimulate capability development 
A strong relationship with industry, developed in this decade of change, has assured 
both flexibility and willingness to rapidly adapt to trends in product malfunction, an 
example being the introduction of successive generations of the FAST-1® sternal 
intraosseous device (used to give drugs and fluid into the breastbone when no other 
site is available; Cooper, Hodgetts et al 2007).  
 
An equally important and operationally sensitive relationship that has developed 
serendipitously is the joint development of personal and vehicle protective solutions 
using the detailed injury and survival data maintained by RCDM, and the expertise of 
the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl [sic]). JTTR is a key source 
for Dstl’s continued development of protection within the Dismounted Close Combat 
and PARSIFAL (accelerated armour protection) programmes, which have been 
credited with saving soldiers’ lives in Afghanistan and Iraq (Dstl 2010). It was, for 
example, analysis of JTTR data in 2009 (my analysis while deployed) that identified 
the trend of genital injuries in current operations, which directly led to the 
development of protection by Dstl and the introduction of the “combat codpiece” in 
2010 (Wyatt 2011). The argument is strong, therefore, that systems of information 
management and continuous detailed audit of combat deaths and injuries have 
transformed Defence’s ability to respond in an agile, evidence-based way to manage 
future Force Protection risk. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This assertion is verifiable by grey literature (internal reports derived from sub judice post mortem data, managed 
by the author 2004-2010). 
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4.6 Has system modernisation improved outcome? 
4.6.1 Unexpected survivors 
Paper 20 
ORGANISATION 
(GOVERNANCE) 
Russell R, Hodgetts T, McLeod J, Starkey K, Mahoney P et al. 
The role of trauma scoring in developing trauma clinical 
governance in the Defence Medical Services.  
Phil Trans Royal Society B 2011; 366(1562): 171-91. 
 
The analysis of unexpected survivors is the principal quantifiable evidence of 
remarkable system performance and, by deduction, evidence that performance has 
significantly improved (Russell, Hodgetts et al 2011, Paper 20). Further, by second 
order deduction, it is evidence that the change constitutes an RM2A because it is this 
evidence that satisfies Cohen’s (2009) third criterion: that outcome is transformed.  
 
Paper 20 is an analysis of 2 year’s outcome (2006-8) from severe injury on 
expeditionary operations. A combination of internationally validated mathematical 
modelling is used (Table 4.2) tempered through independent case review by an 
expert panel. This composite approach balanced by clinical judgement is necessary 
because of weaknesses of individual mathematical models when relied on in 
isolation. The Injury Severity Score (ISS), for example, will consistently under-
represent the severity of military blast trauma as only one amputated limb can 
contribute to the score, irrespective of whether the patient has multiple amputations. 
This weakness is transferred into TRISS (a combination of ISS and the Revised 
Trauma Score), thereby over-estimating the probability of survival. The New Injury 
Severity Score (NISS) allows for multiple injuries in the same body region and is 
therefore preferred in the military context—both scores are calculated as it is 
important to compare like for like when a military system is compared with a civilian 
system, even if the model is flawed. 
 
 Trauma scoring model Measure 
1 ISS (Injury Severity Score) Greater than or equal to 60 
2 NISS (New Injury Severity Score) Greater than or equal to 60 
3 TRISS (probability of survival, Ps) Less than 50% 
4 ASCOT (probability of death, Pd) Greater than or equal to 50%  
5 Cardiac arrest Documented cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR) 
 
Table 4.2: Mathematical Models to Determine ‘Unexpected Survivors’ 
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75 cases were characterised as unexpected survivors, which represents 25% of all 
seriously injured survivors; in comparison, the rate of unexpected survivors in NHS 
hospitals achieved a maximum of 6% over a similar period of 2006-9 (National Audit 
Office 2010). 44 patients were "mathematical unexpected survivors” and 34 of these 
were validated by peer review. The additional 41 cases were identified as "clinical 
unexpected survivors”: of this group, 36/41 (88%) had their outcome attributed to the 
advanced resuscitation strategies in the military to arrest and treat catastrophic 
haemorrhage following combat trauma. The 41 ‘clinical’ cases were subcategorised 
as 26 "civilian unexpected, but military expected" and 15 "civilian and military 
unexpected": this allowed the expert panel to further differentiate those cases that 
would be expected to die in both environments from those expected to survive in a 
field setting but to die in the NHS, where the military advances were as yet poorly 
adopted.  
 
4.6.2 Trauma cardiac arrest survivors 
In a subset analysis, survival following cardiac arrest as a result of trauma was 24% 
in the military deployed trauma system (Paper 20). This is more than 3 times greater 
than the best recorded survival to hospital discharge in UK civilian practice—7.5% in 
over 10 consecutive years with the London Helicopter Emergency Medical Service  
(HEMS; Lockey et al 2006). Of relevance, survival in the London HEMS series 
remained very low for hypovolaemic arrest (blood loss), which was the principal 
underlying factor within the military cohort. 
 
Paper 2 
OPERATIONS 
(1ST AID) 
Hodgetts T, Hanlan C, Newey C.  
Battlefield First Aid: a simple, systematic approach for every soldier. 
JR Army Med Corps 1999a; 145: 55-59. 
 
Traumatic cardiac arrest survival in itself represents a volte-face in military thinking 
and clinical doctrine, and an exceptional outcome: it screams a revolutionary change 
to achieve this. In 1999, a new system of individual first aid was brought into the 
Army, ‘Individual Training Directive (Army) Number 3’ (Hodgetts et al 1999a, Paper 
2). This replaced lecture-based teaching with solely practical teaching; replaced 
assessment by multiple-choice questions with practical skills and scenario-based 
testing; and provided a simple, systematic set of generic first aid drills within a pocket 
aide memoire, Battlefield First Aid Drills (Hodgetts 1999b). In educational terms, this 
was a completely novel approach to first aid. Bravely, it extrapolated the heroic but 
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futile civilian experience from traumatic cardiac arrest (where meta-analysis 
demonstrated a survival approaching 0%—Boyd et al 1992) to the hostile 
environment of the battlefield: the deduction was there was no place for cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on the battlefield, as all that would be achieved would 
be a ‘change in the geographical site of death’ while placing rescuers at considerable 
risk.  
 
 
JDP 4–03.1
51Section 2
1st Edition September 2008 
not 
injured
no
 Triage Sieve
Incident management 5a
1a5a
Incident 
management
Walking
no
Breathing
yes
yes
Airway 
opening 
proceduresno
Catastrophic 
limb bleeding
10–30/min
Breathing rate
yes
Pulse rate & 
response
OK
use tourniquet
T3injured
T2
T1
T1
T1
T1
Under 10 or over 30/min
unconscious or over 120/min
conscious and under 120/min
WriteStarts to breathe: 
Roll to ¾ prone position
Write
Write
Write
Write
Write
Write priority on casualty’s cheek or where visible
Or if in combat 
return to 
fi ghting force
Survivor 
reception
Under 
effective 
enemy fi re
DEAD
no
NOT under effective enemy fi re: 
Call for assistance to carry out BLS
 
Figure 4.4: Battlefield Casualty Drills and Triage Sieve Incorporating CPR 
[CPR on this algorithm is synonymous with BLS, Basic Life Support] [4th edition cover shown, 2005] 
 
In parallel, argument was made to retain CPR as a skill for the UK home base and 
peacekeeping operations, to contribute to the capability to deal with sudden cardiac 
death in the community. However, it was not until the 3rd edition of the aide memoire 
in 2004 that revised guidance was given for ‘troops in contact’, re-instating CPR as a 
skill in the combat environment (Hodgetts 2004a).11 The step change in outcome is 
linked to when CPR is coupled with advanced interventions by a consultant-led and 
helicopter-borne resuscitation team (the Medical Emergency Response Team, 
MERT), which was introduced in Afghanistan from 2006 (Davis et al 2007).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Battlefield First Aid was re-named Battlefield Casualty Drills on launch of the 3rd edition. 
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When the MERT team can intervene immediately following an arrest with advanced 
procedures (drugs, airway and surgical skills, blood transfusion) there is a small 
window of opportunity; benefits are also realised for those that arrest at the field 
hospital and receive immediate advanced intervention. It would be misleading to 
believe those who arrest on the battlefield and receive extended CPR from a buddy 
have a 24% chance of survival. They do not. It is the early access to CPR and 
advanced resuscitation that counts, which is compellingly coupled to the observed 
serially reducing clinical timeline from wounding to emergency surgery (McLeod, 
Hodgetts et al 2007h, Paper 13; see Section 4.7)—a postulated result of both 
process improvement and geographical contraction of the Area of Operation. 
 
4.6.3 Cardiac arrest prevention: out of hospital 
Where the difference is made at the point of wounding is the ability to sustain a 
patient and avoid cardiac arrest prior to the arrival of specialist medical support. This 
has, as described, involved doctrinal change through the concept of <C>ABC, an 
improved systematic approach to first aid and a rigorous audit and feedback system 
that monitors performance and adjusts practice accordingly. What has not yet been 
factored is the addition of a layer of advanced first aid capability in 2006, specifically 
designed to increase the chance of survival from massive haemorrhage. This is the 
Army Team Medic. At its inception the intent was to train 1:4 combat soldiers against 
an aide memoire (Hodgetts 2008b) that builds on the principles and skills within 
Battlefield Casualty Drills. The perceived success is now so high that military 
commanders demand a minimum of 1:2 trained to this level for contemporary 
operations, with the stated aspiration that all soldiers should be Team Medics. The 
doctrinal rationale is to supplement the life-saving interventions possible within the 
‘Platinum Ten Minutes’ of opportunity, thereby sustaining life until specialist medical 
support is available within the ‘Golden Hour’ (Cowley 1976).  
 
The Army Team Medic has been the far forward focus for introduction of new 
medicated bandage technology to stop bleeding from wounds that are not amenable 
to a tourniquet; in parallel, novel methods of training have been devised that use out 
of date blood products to activate these ‘haemostatic dressings’ in a realistic model 
(Moorhouse et al 2007). An innovation in capability level has therefore exploited 
innovation in technology and stimulated innovation in training. This has changed the 
shape of first aid provision on the battlefield, specifically altering the equipment, team 
organisation and doctrine of battlefield first aid—the Toffler (1993) criteria for a ‘true 
revolution’.  
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4.6.4 Cardiac arrest prevention: in hospital 
Paper 5 
ORGANISATION 
(SYSTEMS) 
Hodgetts T, Kenward G, Vlachonicholis I, Payne S, Castle N et 
al. Incidence, location and reasons for avoidable  
in-hospital cardiac arrest in a district general hospital. 
Resuscitation 2002b; 54: 115-123. 
 
Despite the exceptional success of traumatic cardiac arrest resuscitation in the pre-
hospital operational environment and the introduction of the Team Medic capability to 
potentially prevent arrest through early and effective intervention, there remains a 
spectre of avoidable in-hospital cardiac arrest. This was quantified for a UK hospital 
in 2002 (Hodgetts et al 2002b, Paper 5) when a staggering 68% of arrests were 
found to be avoidable by expert panel analysis. Extrapolating to the NHS gave a 
crude estimate of 23,000 avoidable deaths per year nationwide. The importance of 
prevention is the universally poor outcome at one year following in-hospital arrest, 
averaging 15% (Gwinnutt 2000).  
 
Principal risk factors for avoidable arrest were admission to a general ward rather 
than a critical care area (Odds Ratio 5.1; 95% CI 2.2, 11.9; P<0.001), or admission to 
an inappropriate area (Odds Ratio 12.6; 95% CI 1.6, 97.7). Avoidable cardiac arrests 
were more likely at weekends than weekdays (P<0.02). Clinical signs of deterioration 
in the preceding 24 hours were not acted upon in 48%, with review confined to a 
House Officer (modern equivalent is Foundation Year 1) in 45%—understandably, in 
100% of avoidable cases treatment leading up to the arrest was judged to be 
inadequate. 
 
What is disappointing is that the NHS has demonstrated its failure to learn 
organisationally. 10 years after these findings the research company Dr Foster has 
reported a worrying 10% spike in deaths at weekends compared with weekdays 
across 147 NHS Hospital Trusts (Dr Foster 2012) and has noted that those hospitals 
with the fewest senior doctors available at the weekend have the highest mortality. 
This is reinforced by the NCEPOD report ‘Time to Intervene’ (NCEPOD 2012), stated 
by the Chair of NCEPOD to be ‘the most important report NCEPOD has produced in 
the last 10 years’ (p5) and that it was ‘thoroughly dispiriting to find that…if the patient 
had been managed as they should have been…the arrest would not have occurred 
in the majority of cases. This is bad medicine…’ (p6). 
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What is worse than the NHS ignoring the reasons for avoidable death (Paper 5), is 
failure to adopt the solution provided (Hodgetts et al 2002c, Paper 6) having been 
given the tools to do so—a nationally distributed DVD training package provided free 
to all hospital Resuscitation Officers (Hodgetts and Kenward 2004). The reasons 
why the NHS struggles to adopt innovation are discussed in Part D, The Way 
Forward. Understanding the barriers to innovation adoption is important if 
organisational learning from contemporary combat casualty care experience is to be 
effectively transferred (Box 4.1). 
 
BARRIERS TO ADOPTION: MEDICAL EMERGENCY TEAM 
Having gathered the evidence for avoidable cardiac arrest at Frimley Park Hospital, 
the change programme to fully implement the Medical Emergency Team solution 
across the Trust took approximately 1 year and the resources of a full-time project 
nurse. In parallel, during a field hospital deployment to Oman in 2001 (Exercise Saif 
Sarrea II) the solution was introduced over 48 hours. The differences are principally 
those of culture and directed change: when change is ordered in a military 
environment it happens, but every consultant within an NHS hospital is a potential 
focus of resistance that can stall or derail a change process.  
 
Box 4.1: Barriers to Adoption of Innovation—NHS vs DMS 
 
Paper 6 
ORGANISATION 
(SYSTEMS) 
Hodgetts T, Kenward G, Vlachonicholis I, Payne S, Castle N. 
The identification of risk factors for cardiac arrest and formulation 
of activation criteria to alert a medical emergency team. 
Resuscitation 2002c; 54: 125-131. 
 
The solution to preventing avoidable in-hospital cardiac arrest is a Medical 
Emergency Team (MET) activated on evidence-based criteria (Paper 6, Figure 4.5) 
and following standardised best practice guidelines. Activating the MET alone was 
not enough when the treatment by doctors was shown to be consistently inadequate. 
A set of guidelines with a novel, intuitive, symptom based structure was devised to 
cover all those conditions that had been demonstrated to underpin the avoidable 
arrests (Hodgetts et al 2002d): these proved to be an important conceptual 
precursor to Clinical Guidelines for Operations (Hodgetts 2007e).  
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Although antecedents of cardiac arrest were known to be common and empirical 
systems for triggering MET response had been developed (Hourihan et al 1995), this 
was the first time risk factors had been quantified and structured into a weighted 
response (Figure 4.6).  A series of criteria were identified as significant predictors of 
cardiac arrest when compared with non-arrest controls. These included abnormal 
pulse (P<0.001), reduced systolic blood pressure (P<0.001), abnormal temperature 
(P<0.001), reduced pulse oximetry (P<0.001), and chest pain (P<0.001). Logistic 
regression identified three significant independent associations with cardiac arrest: 
abnormal breathing indicator (abnormal rate or a symptom of shortness of breath) 
(OR 3.49; 95% CI 1.69-7.21); abnormal pulse (OR 4.07; 95% CI 2.0-8.31) and 
reduced systolic blood pressure (OR 19.92; 95% CI 9.48-41.84).  
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Figure 4.5: MET Evidence-based Activation Criteria 
 
The importance of the ‘breathing indicator’ resonated strongly with the finding that 
basic nursing observations were omitted or not cted up n (Paper 5)—what was 
necessary was an educational campaign to ‘Put the R back into TPR’ (Kenward and 
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Hodgetts 2001). The lack of NHS organisational learning in the following ten years 
was evident in 2011 when the Chief Executive and General Secretary of the Royal 
College of Nursing admitted that the lack of basic care skills for new nurses was 
nothing short of a disgrace (Public Service 2011).  
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Figure 4.6: MET Weighted Response 
 
For the combat environment at least, in-hospital cardiac arrest prevention training is 
now institutionalised within a field hospital’s preparation for deployment, so the 
system stays active on every turnover of staff each 3 months irrespective of the 
parent NHS hospital from which regular and reserve personnel are drawn.  
 
4.7 Have shortened timelines improved outcome? 
Paper 13 
OPERATIONS 
(TIMELINES) 
McLeod J, Hodgetts T, Mahoney P. Combat “Category A” calls: 
evaluating the pre-hospital timelines in a military trauma system. JR 
Army Med Corps 2007h; 153(4): 266-268. 
 
Survival from injury is time-dependent, with this dependency expressed within 
Cowley’s (1976) concept of the Golden Hour. Media criticism in 2007 of a perceived 
delay in treatment for seriously injured soldiers in Afghanistan prompted analysis of a 
previously unquantifiable timeline. In a sample of 528 patients transported by 
helicopter over 13 months, it identified a median time from injury to surgery of 99 
minutes for the most seriously injured category (T1 on the Triage Sieve, see Figure 
4.4). While this proved achievement of the mandated maximum 2 hours to surgery 
within NATO policy—and defused the political tension from media criticism—it still fell 
short of clinical aspirations.  
 
This milestone in being able to accurately measure the timeline was achieved 
through cultural change to insist the paramedic verified all timings with the Joint 
Operations Centre on conclusion of the incident and recorded them on the patient 
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report form. Superficially this appears simple and obvious, but the inertia to record 
pre-hospital information in the combat setting was institutionalised, a fact 
demonstrated by American allies (Therien et al 2011) who identified that only 18.6% 
of ‘battle casualties’ from Afghanistan had pre-hospital information recorded on the 
US military trauma registry. 
 
The initiative has been a catalyst to continually measure, report and further improve 
timelines, which have serially fallen to below 60 minutes in subsequent phases of the 
campaign.12 This is deduced to be a combined feature of improved helicopter 
resource availability; changes in tactics to launch the helicopter; and a reducing 
geographic area of responsibility (with correspondingly shorter flight times). However, 
the explicit effect of time on improved and ‘unexpected’ outcomes has not been 
proven in this population: it is a supposition rather than a causal link and gap that 
demands academic scrutiny. 
 
4.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has described the transformative changes to the organisation of the 
DMS and to operational processes to improve the clinical governance of combat 
trauma. Without this governance framework that provides the evidence of system 
weaknesses on a day-to-day basis, it would not have been possible to promote either 
the culture or momentum for sustained change.  
 
This chapter has also demonstrated the consequences of failure to adopt a solution 
to prevent in-hospital cardiac arrest within the NHS, which at its best can be 
explained by the inertia of a large organisation to change and at its worst is 
institutional negligence to prevent avoidable deaths.  
 
The next chapter turns to the revolution in technology and how advances in 
equipment to support combat casualty care have been exploited.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Verified through internal organisational reporting from data held on the Joint Theatre Trauma Registry. 
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5. Technological Revolution 
5.1 Tourniquet is not a dirty word 
Paper 14 
TECHNOLOGY 
(TOURNIQUET) 
Brodie S, Hodgetts, T, Ollerton J, McLeod J, Lambert P et al. 
Tourniquet use in combat trauma: UK military experience. 
JR Army Med Corps 2007; 153(4): 310-313. 
 
The conceptual re-introduction of tourniquets, and the internal organisational 
resistance this generated, has been highlighted in Section 3.3. The UK’s clinical 
evidence for the utility of tourniquets comes from peer review of critically 
hypovolaemic multiple amputees following blast injury (Box 5.1). 
 
4½ years continuous UK military experience in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2003-7 
was analysed for the impact of tourniquets in first aid. 107 tourniquets were applied 
to 70 patients. Most applications (64/70 patients) occurred after 2006, when 
tourniquets were issued to individual soldiers. 87% (61/70) survived their injuries. 
There were reversible complications in 3 patients, none of which contributed to 
unnecessary limb loss. 
 
Traditional mathematical modelling (Injury Severity Score, TRISS Methodology) 
characteristically underestimates the severity of injury with multiple amputations, as 
only one limb can be scored. Peer review identified survival in a cohort of patients 
with a combination of multiple limb amputation, physiological evidence of critical 
hypovolaemia and a requirement for massive transfusion at hospital. These ‘clinical 
unexpected survivors’ received tourniquets at the point of wounding, and their 
immediate survival to reach hospital was attributed to this. 
 
Box 5.1: Combat Tourniquet: UK Military Experience 
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Figure 5.1: The Combat Application Tourniquet—individual issue since 2006 
 
Perhaps more powerfully is the overwhelming cultural acceptance of tourniquets as a 
life-saving intervention by the individual soldier. Soldiers have observed how early 
treatment saves the lives of their friends and tourniquets have become deeply 
embedded in contemporary regimental legend. In some respects their value has 
become distorted with a known practice to ‘pre-apply’ tourniquets to the thighs prior 
to combat or to incorporate tourniquets within combat clothing (Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Integrated Tourniquet Clothing System 
 
As Sloan observes, technology advances may underwrite a military revolution, but 
they must be absorbed into revised doctrine and supported within adapted 
organisational structures before a revolution is possible (Sloan 2002). Boot echoes 
the sentiment when he states that ‘technology creates the potential for a military 
revolution’ (Boot 2006, p.10). What both analysts are saying is that technology 
precedes revolution. But is this the case for medical technology advances? Has there 
been purposeful primary technological innovation, or purely serendipity? Sloan 
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further claims that the technologies that underpin a military revolution are often 
developed in the civilian sector and are then adapted or exploited for military use. 
This assumption is challenged within military medicine, where a military requirement 
can be demonstrated to drive a primary military solution. 
 
5.2 Volcanic dust and crushed shellfish applications 
Paper 8 
TECHNOLOGY 
(HAEMOSTATICS) 
Hodgetts T, Russell R, Russell MQ, Mahoney P, Kenward G. 
Evaluation of clinician attitudes to the implementation of novel 
haemostatics. JR Army Med Corps 2005a; 151:139-41. 
 
In October 1993, US Rangers and Delta Force were engaged with Somalian militia in 
the Battle of Mogadishu where 17 American soldiers were killed. The details of the 
ultimately hopeless struggle to control bleeding from a groin wound of one soldier are 
captured in the book Black Hawk Down (Bowden 1999) and this frustration was 
transferred into a challenge to industry, with the model of major groin vessel injury re-
created in the laboratory in terminally anaesthetised pigs (Alam et al 2003). The 
resulting innovations have re-set the bar of expectation for what can be achieved to 
control external bleeding from ‘junctional’ wounds—that is, wounds in the groin, axilla 
(armpit) and neck with injury to major blood vessels, where a tourniquet is ineffective 
or, in the case of the neck, contra-indicated. 
 
Figure 5.3: QuikClot® powder applied to British combat casualty during surgery 
 
The first of these innovations was QuikClot®, a zeolite powder derived from volcanic 
rock (Figure 5.3). When swine modelling confirmed its efficacy (Alam et al 2004) it 
was rapidly approved for military medical use in both the US (from 2003) and UK 
(from 2004), and later consolidated within BATLS training (Hodgetts 2006b-c) and 
clinical doctrine (Hodgetts 2007e). QuikClot® was introduced at the same time as a 
new elastic bandage and the Combat Application Tourniquet. Collectively these 
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interventions were referred to as ‘novel haemostatics’ and I developed a bespoke 
package to augment existing training materials, facilitating the rapid adoption of 
these innovations. Paper 8 (Hodgetts et al 2005a) describes the impact of this 
training on confidence to treat complex combat wounds—a ‘before and after’ training 
questionnaire that identifies a highly significant improvement in confidence to treat 
traumatic amputation (P<0.0001) and ragged groin wound (P<0.0001). Of the 86 
clinical staff who completed both questionnaires, 94% believed there was benefit 
from the new techniques; 91% believed the elastic field dressing was an 
improvement over the traditional first field dressing; 98% believed the combat 
application tourniquet was an improvement over the Samway tourniquet;13 100% 
believed that the availability of QuikClot® improved the effectiveness to control 
external bleeding; and 97% believed the potential benefits of QuikClot® outweighed 
the potential risks. 
 
The first human case series of QuikClot® use was of 103 casualties, which included 
69 combat casualties in Iraq, the remainder being in the US civilian setting. The 
overall effectiveness was reported as 92% (Rhee et al 2008). Importantly, although 
outside the scope of initial development intention, 20 of the cases were of internal 
use by surgeons to stop solid organ bleeding (lung, liver). In this respect, clinicians 
were pushing the boundary of a step change innovation from the outset (Figure 5.3).  
 
However, QuikClot® powder had important side effects. In particular it generated 
enough heat to cause a skin burn if the skin was not dried before application. 
Together with the difficulty of applying a powder deep into a wound, confounded by a 
hostile environment (wind; or turbulence inside a medical evacuation helicopter), the 
UK recommendations were for use no further forward than a professional Combat 
Medical Technician and as a two-person technique (Hodgetts 2007e). This left the 
door open for aggressive market competition and encouraged serial incremental 
innovation to minimise side effects and maximise ease of use by a single field 
operator (Sondeen et al 2003).  
 
In 2006, MoD was able to introduce a safer agent that generated no heat (chitosan—
derived from crushed shellfish), and was impregnated into a stiff 8x8cm bandage. 
Additionally, an individual soldier could effectively apply it. This was the HemCon® 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This is a rubber tube that has been in use since WW2. 
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bandage and it was pushed as far forward as the Army Team Medic. QuikClot® was 
retained for use as an alternative by professional medical staff. 
 
Figure 5.4: HemCon® being applied to a ballistic limb wound 
[Colonel Hodgetts is the clinician applying HemCon®] 
 
A challenge when introducing these new agents was to develop a realistic training 
model. Soldiers unused to dealing with bleeding would not be prepared effectively if 
their only training experience was a ‘dry’ model where there was no activation of the 
haemostatic agent. My academic department (ADMEM) designed an innovative 
training model utilising packed red cells and plasma that had exceeded its shelf life 
and was destined for incineration (Moorhouse et al 2007, Figure 5.5). This was 
infused through a simulated large vessel (urinary catheter) at the base of a large 
wound (section of belly pork with skin, fat and muscle). I effectively applied this 
model for the first time in Iraq and Afghanistan to give confidence in the use of topical 
haemostatics to both Team Medics (advanced first aid providers at the point of 
wounding) and hospital Emergency Department staff (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5.5: A realistic model for topical haemostatic training 
(1) Expired red cells and plasma are used to activate the products; (2) A piece of belly pork is prepared with a urinary 
catheter in the base of a ‘wound’; (3) Blood products infused through the catheter are released into the wound 
through an incision in the catheter wall; (4a) QuikClot® is applied and (4b) HemCon® is applied; (5) Pressure is 
applied into the wound through a dressing; (6a) Activated QuikClot® in situ and (6b) Activated HemCon® in situ. 
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Figure 5.6: Team Medics training in the field hospital with HemCon® 
[Colonel Hodgetts is shown far left] 
 
A further step change has generated pliable ribbon gauze impregnated with a 
chitosan-based agent that performs superiorly in the laboratory (Kozen et al 2008) 
and has the important added advantage of being easily packed into large, irregular 
wounds—this Celox Gauze® has replaced both products in UK from 2010 for use by 
all providers from the Army Team Medic to the field hospital surgeon. 
 
The rapid serial adoption of the topical haemostatic agents highlights the adaptability 
of the organisation to maintain an emergent strategy and to respond to repeated 
innovation that was being stimulated by operational experience. It is an illustration of 
constantly revising the processes of ‘battle’ and repeatedly amending the rules of the 
game. But this mature approach to serial innovation is not invariable within the 
military. In 2005 there was a public and acrimonious disagreement between 
branches of the US Department of Defence regarding the optimal haemostatic 
dressing to be universally accepted, which stemmed from a conflict of interest. The 
US Army had conducted the research to support HemCon®, while the US Marines 
had conducted the research to support QuikClot®. The result was the open 
undermining of confidence in relative product performance, ultimately requiring 
Congressional adjudication (Little 2005). As Defence budgets contract in an age of 
austerity and the Defence industry becomes smaller and more competitive, the 
model for future innovation requires careful consideration: an increasing partnership 
seems logical and inevitable, but this conflicts with UK Defence’s traditional concerns 
of probity and propriety that are a barrier to commercial collaboration. 
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5.3 Paediatric Triage 
Paper 1 
TECHNOLOGY 
(TRIAGE) 
Hodgetts T, Hall J, Maconochie I, Smart C.  
The Paediatric Triage Tape.   
Pre-hospital Immediate Care 1998; 2: 155-159. 
 
Effective prioritisation of children in the pre-hospital setting is of even greater 
importance than for adults: but what is the rationale for this? Paediatric resources are 
typically limited in a district general hospital and are extremely limited in a field 
hospital, where the military mission does not generally cater for specialist paediatric 
staff within its core capability. Paradoxically, the volume of paediatric trauma is 
disproportionate in a field hospital—although children consistently make up only 2-
3% of field hospital attendees (Walker, Russell, Hodgetts 2010; Gurney 2004) these 
are skewed because of eligibility criteria to critically injured cases, with 100% hospital 
admissions being trauma14 and 88% cases being triage categories T1 or T2 (Walker, 
Russell, Hodgetts 2010).  
 
 
Figure 5.7: Paediatric Triage Tape 
 
Physiological triage systems are more consistent than anatomical systems 
(Hodgetts and Mackway-Jones 1995a) and physiological systems have been widely 
distributed into military practice from first aid to hospital care (Hodgetts 1999b, 
2006b, 2008a-b). Nevertheless, there is a risk of over-triage if adult systems are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 British Field Hospital, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, May 2006 to December 2007. 
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applied to children and this will potentially misdirect the limited hospital resources. 
The Paediatric Triage Tape (PTT, Figure 5.7) uses the relationship of age, length 
and weight to adjust the adult Triage Sieve (Figure 4.4) for representative children’s 
values. Best practice is incorporated into the physiological assessment, 
recommending that capillary refill is performed on the forehead, which together with 
the sternum are the only sites that generate a true Gaussian distribution (Strozik et al 
1997)—the sternum is not recommended primarily as time would be added to expose 
the child’s chest during what should be a very rapid assessment. Further, the chosen 
‘normal’ ranges of vital signs exploit the limited best evidence available (Poets et al 
1993) supported by expert consensus (ALSG 1996). 
 
In a validation of PTT in a children’s hospital in South Africa (Wallis and Carley 
2006), PTT had a very high specificity to rule out non-T1 patients (98.6%), but a low 
sensitivity to detect in the field those ultimately determined to be seriously injured 
(37.8%). The over-triage and under-triage rates were within the range deemed 
unavoidable by the American College of Surgeons. 
 
Paper 7 
ORGANISATION 
(SYSTEMS) 
Hodgetts T, Mahoney P, Mozumder A, McLennan J.  
Care of Civilians during Military Operations.  
International Journal of Disaster Medicine 2005b; 3: 3-24. 
 
Linked to the requirement to effectively triage children because of the need to 
prioritise limited treatment resources, a formal analysis of the military’s capability to 
treat civilians on operations has been undertaken (Hodgetts et al 2005b, Paper 7). 
The catalyst for the review was the anxiety in treating a substantial number of injured 
children during the Iraq War of 2003 (Hodgetts 2004c), without the necessary 
specialist equipment. International Humanitarian Law, expressed through the UN 
Rights of the Child to which the UK is a signatory, directs that if there is a 
responsibility to treat children then the staff training and supporting equipment must 
be appropriate. The military’s engagement in treating civilians on operations has 
been an enduring area of friction with civilian agencies (International and Non-
Government Organisations) where boundaries of responsibility have been contested, 
the trigger for use of the military as a ‘last resort’ has been inconsistent, and the 
independence and impartiality of humanitarian organisations is perceived to be 
undermined by association with the military. In order to build consensus through 
mutual understanding a Delphi study (Paper 7) drew together an expert panel of 40 
civilian and military actors and achieved consensus of >80% on 218/309 (70.5%) 
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statements over 3 rounds. This is a landmark for setting the standards for future civil-
military cooperation. There are, however, 2 criticisms that can be fielded: the first is 
the balance of the panel composition (35/40 were military) and the second is the 
background of the civilian actors. The willingness to interface with the military is on a 
spectrum ranging from close collaboration through to uncomfortable coexistence: 
only civilian agencies that were collaborative by nature participated in the study. 
 
5.4 Wider technology advances 
There are considerable wider technology advances that confirm a revolution. So far 
only those advances relating to first aid have been described that I directly 
influenced. To understand the full impact of technology on military medicine in the 
last decade would require a detailed analysis of the innovations in pre-hospital 
emergency care (bone infusion devices; surgical airway kit; chest drain kit), field 
hospital resuscitation (platelet aphaeresis15; thromboelastography16; recombinant 
factor VIIa), imaging (CT scan; ultrasound; digital X-ray; telemedicine); aeromedical 
evacuation (elastomeric pumps for in-transit pain relief); and rehabilitation (limb 
prosthetics). Some of these are commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or militarily adapted 
COTS (‘MOTS’) innovations as Sloan (2002) suggests, and some are bespoke to the 
military requirement. Imaging and coagulation advances are selected for further 
analysis because of their profound importance for emergency medicine and, in the 
latter, my direct influence. 
 
5.4.1 Imaging advances 
In the first Gulf War in 1991, imaging to support clinical decision making was 
confined to conventional radiography, generating x-ray images on celluloid using a 
wet processing technique that was dependent on the continued supply of reagent 
chemicals. Capability was enhanced in Kosovo in 1999 by the availability of portable 
ultrasound for use in the Emergency Department to detect free blood in the abdomen 
and prompt explorative surgery: however, only the radiographers (radiology 
technicians) were trained to do this and their experience was variable (Hodgetts et 
al 2000a, Paper 3). By 2003 and the second Gulf War, doctors in the trauma team 
were learning a focused ultrasound technique, which has continued to gain 
momentum as an immediate diagnostic and decision-making tool. Computerised 
tomography (CT) scanning was first deployed as a Land capability within a UK field 
hospital in 2004. Prior to this, patients had to be moved to another country for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Harvesting fresh platelets from donors in the operational Theatre. 
16 An analyser that displays how a patient’s blood is clotting graphically and in real-time.  
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diagnosis and treatment (e.g. Kosovo to Macedonia; Hodgetts et al 2000a, Paper 
3)—a Hobson’s therapeutic choice as ‘sick patients travel badly’ (Hodgetts and 
Turner 2006f), but effective treatment requires accurate diagnosis. CT in the field 
hospital allowed determination of whether such a move was beneficial, and what 
treatment to optimise outcome should be done prior to movement. Subsequently, the 
reliance on whole body CT as a screening tool in severe blast injury has modified the 
resuscitation process, has led to two scanners being deployed simultaneously with a 
substantial enhancement in the sophistication of the machines (MoD 2010), and has 
demanded the routine deployment of radiologists (specialist doctors). When coupled 
with the recent parallel implementation of digital x-ray (BBC 2010) to replace wet film 
(which has the triple benefit of removing hazardous chemicals from the process, 
eliminating a logistic burden, and shortening decision-making in resuscitation by ~10 
minutes through instant image display), it is reasonable to assert that imaging is a 
prime example of combined technology, organisation and clinical practice 
transformation. 
 
5.4.2 Coagulation advances 
Paper 16 
TECHNOLOGY 
(DRUGS) 
Hodgetts T, Kirkman E, Mahoney P, Russell R, Thomas R et al. 
UK Defence Medical Services guidance for the use of recombinant 
Factor VIIa in the deployed military setting. 
JR Army Med Corps 2007g; 153(4): 307-9. 
 
For 25% of seriously injured patients who survive to reach hospital there is a 
continuing threat that relates to an inability of the blood to clot effectively: this is 
known as the coagulopathy of trauma (Brohi et al 2003). A 5-fold increase in 
mortality with early coagulopathy has been quantified in civilian practice (MacLeod et 
al 2003), but the advances in treatment to reverse the disorder have arisen in 
contemporary combat casualty care (Holcomb et al 2007). Additionally, the 
statistically proven higher severity of combat trauma over civilian trauma (Hodgetts 
et al 2007a) can be assumed to have the same if not higher relative mortality when 
all other factors are equal, but as this thesis has demonstrated all other factors are 
not equal. 
 
Trauma resuscitation in civilian and military practice until 2007 concentrated on 
replacing lost blood with red cells and crystalloid. This is not intuitive: it restores 
oxygen carrying capacity, but fails to restore any capacity to support coagulation. A 
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clinical doctrine and organisational change to resuscitate aggressively with plasma 
alongside red cells in a 1:1 ratio supplemented by boosts of platelets (Jansen et al 
2009) has a teleological foundation. It has created a marked logistical challenge for 
the National Blood Service and the Royal Air Force to manage a 5,000-mile blood 
product supply chain, and has stimulated a new application of technology to monitor 
the effectiveness of treatment—the thromboelastogram (TEG)—which had been 
applied successfully in elective liver surgery, but was not being exploited to manage 
the coagulopathy of trauma.  
 
Parallel advances woven into and strengthening this new fabric of field hospital 
resuscitation have been new doctrine, training and equipment to support platelet 
aphaeresis, as the expeditionary supply chain is too fragile to fully support the 
requirement (platelets are a scarce resource in the UK, with a shelf life of only 3 
days); and the contentious off-label use of the haemophilia drug recombinant Factor 
VIIa, or ‘rFVIIa’ (Hodgetts et al 2007g, Paper 16), which is exceptionally expensive 
but has proven life-saving in exceptional circumstances (Kenet et al 1999; Williams 
et al 2003).  
 
The need for a clear and rational UK policy for rFVIIa was driven by media criticism 
in the UK (BBC 2006) and US (Los Angeles Times 2006) that its off-label use 
constituted experimentation and was an indicator of ‘dereliction of duty’ and ‘moral 
bankruptcy’ (Guardian 2006). The ill-informed criticism by a poorly briefed Member of 
Parliament ignored the fact that 80% of UK Intensive Care Units were prepared to 
use the drug in the same clinical circumstances (telephone survey of 40 units); that 
European guidelines from 2006 supported the use of rFVIIa to control traumatic 
haemorrhage when other measures had failed; that large animal evidence 
demonstrated safety and (in some studies) improved outcome; and that human 
evidence demonstrated a decrease in transfusion requirements, particularly relevant 
when there is a fragile and extended supply chain. 
 
These changes have re-written the rule book of fluid resuscitation following injury, 
represent a pronounced difference in trauma care delivered by DMS compared to 
NHS, and through improving survival have changed the expectation of soldiers, their 
families, their commanders and political leaders forever. Whether this is realistically 
sustainable will be discussed later.      
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5.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides detail of the technological revolution in combat casualty care 
with examples focused on equipment and drugs to prevent avoidable death from 
external and internal haemorrhage. However, technology changes have been broad 
based and insight is given to the advances in imaging and paediatric triage, both of 
which assist critical decision-making and prioritisation of clinical action. 
 
In the next section the key themes from the three sections of evidence (doctrinal, 
organisational and technological revolution) are drawn together to summarise the 
argument to support a Revolution in Military Medical Affairs (RM2A) and to prove the 
Homunculus Casualty Theorem. 
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6. Discussion 
6.1 Clarifying the questions 
The fundamental question underpinning the thesis asks whether or not a Revolution 
in Military Medical Affairs (RM2A) has occurred. Subsidiary to this, and the 
assumption of proof of RM2A, is quantification of how the body of work in this 
submission has contributed to the revolution (refer to Chapter 1, page 16 for full 
articulation of the research questions). Finally there is a determination of whether the 
direction of developmental effort has matched the genuine clinical need—this is the 
Homunculus Casualty Theorem and the null hypothesis asserts they are not 
matched. 
 
6.2 Proof of RM2A 
The weight of evidence presented, which brevity constrains from being entirely 
comprehensive, is sufficient to assert that the Defence Medical Services have 
undergone a Revolution in Military Medical Affairs (RM2A). Far from being confined 
to technological advances (which is characteristic of the traditionally described RMA), 
substantial reform has occurred in parallel in organisational structure, systems of 
training, and operational processes.  
 
Collectively, there is substantial proof to satisfy Lambeth’s (1997) criteria (a change 
in military doctrine, operational concepts and organisational concepts, with 
technological innovation), Krepinevich’s (1994) criteria (technological change, 
systems development, operational innovation, organisational adaptation) and 
Cohen’s (2009) criteria (evidence of a change in organisational structure, processes 
and outcomes) for an RMA; additionally, Toffler’s (1993) conditions are satisfied for a 
‘true revolution’ rather than a lesser ‘sub-revolution’ (a change in equipment, team 
organisation, training, doctrine and tactics).  
 
The succession of radical changes has strategic consequences as a tangible 
manifestation of upholding the covenant between the government and its Armed 
Services—that is, the investment (political will and resources) in supporting combat 
casualty care developments fulfils the government’s obligation in demonstrating a 
duty of care to its soldiers. Furthermore, in medical terms at least, the evidence 
refutes Freedman’s claim that only the United States has the economic resources 
and infrastructure to follow the revolutionary path (Freedman 1998). 
 
	   84 
6.2.1 Doctrine 
Fundamentally, a doctrinal shibboleth has been challenged and overturned—ABC to 
<C>ABC (Hodgetts et al 2006, Paper 9)—with proven improved outcome resulting 
from the related systemic transformation (Russell, Hodgetts et al 2011, Paper 20).  
 
A new doctrinal framework of Damage Control Resuscitation has been created to 
encapsulate the common aim to reduce blood loss, optimise oxygenation and 
maximise outcome from point of wounding to intensive care (Hodgetts et al 2007c, 
Paper 15), which is supported by comprehensive, multidisciplinary Clinical 
Guidelines for Operations that uniquely combine trauma, medical, toxicological and 
environmental emergencies in a single system (Hodgetts 2008a). 
 
6.2.2 Organisation 
Emergency Medicine has been transformed from a Cinderella specialty to a core 
specialty within the ten years from its first operational deployment in 1999 (Hodgetts 
et al 2000, Paper 3), with my leadership evident in the changes in education and 
trauma system governance (Smith, Hodgetts et al 2007, Paper 11; Hodgetts et al 
2007d, Paper 12; Willdridge, Hodgetts et al 2010, Paper 19). 
 
A fundamental change to the underpinning treatment principles has demanded a 
fundamental change in training from individual first aid through to hospital-based 
resuscitation: this is reflected in the transformation of the Battlefield First Aid 
programme (Hodgetts et al 1999b, Paper 2) and the Battlefield Advanced Trauma 
Life Support Course (Hodgetts et al 2006c-e, Paper 10). In parallel, a novel 
international approach to major incidents has been implemented and evaluated 
(Hodgetts 2000, Paper 4). 
 
Evidence for changes in team organisation, training and tactics is also provided by 
the development of an evidence-based approach to preventing avoidable in-hospital 
cardiac arrest (Hodgetts et al 2002b-c, Papers 5 & 6). This experience has given an 
important insight into the differences in NHS and DMS culture when implementing 
change and the barriers within NHS to adopting military innovation on a national 
scale.  
 
	   85 
6.2.3 Technology 
The introduction of novel haemostatic dressings has required parallel training to be 
developed and the effectiveness of this training to be evaluated (Hodgetts et al 
2005, Paper 8). Unlike the haemostatic dressings, the reaffirmation of tourniquets as 
an essential component of first aid does not represent the invention of a new clinical 
capability. Yet it does represent the re-acceptance of practice that had become 
relegated to taboo. This has been a ‘revolution’ in two meanings of the word—a rapid 
and profound change in attitude and a cyclical return to earlier accepted practice. In 
revolution, resistance can be expected. Internal resistance was from orthopaedic 
consultants who feared injudicious use would lead to salvageable limbs being 
avoidably lost (Parker and Clasper 2007). This has proven to be unfounded (Kragh et 
al 2009) and the provision of tourniquets to every UK and US soldier has been 
demonstrated to be lifesaving (Brodie, Hodgetts et al, Paper 14; Kragh et al 2008). 
 
6.3 Contribution to Revolution 
The evidence identifies I have acted as a transformational leader to drive the 
concepts, guidelines, training, organisation and governance of the UK’s combat 
casualty care system, focusing in delivery on the ‘acute care’ components (pre-
hospital and emergency medicine). Emergency Medicine has been the vanguard for 
academic advancement of combat casualty care and a catalyst for development of 
the strategic cluster of clinical-academic departments within the Royal Centre for 
Defence Medicine, each adding substantially to the body of medical knowledge. 
 
6.4 The Homunculus Casualty Theorem 
Just as the functional proportions of man’s brain are represented in the homunculus 
(Figure 6.1), the proportion of lethal or debilitating combat injuries are represented in 
the homunculus casualty. The question is whether the effort within the RM2A 
matches the relative importance of each injury—and how, perhaps, the homunculus 
casualty could evolve over time.  
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Figure 6.1: Homunculus Man and Homunculus Casualty 
 
The emphasis for the early management of severe combat trauma is on stopping 
catastrophic external bleeding. The rationale is that acute haemorrhage accounts for 
up to 50% of conventional deaths on the battlefield (Bellamy 1984) and up to one 
third of historical deaths are estimated to be preventable by early intervention 
(Bellamy 1986), particularly by arresting bleeding from limbs. The homunculus 
casualty is dominated by a proximal (above knee) amputation and a junctional groin 
wound (Figure 6.1), reflecting these treatable injury patterns. Linked to this are the 
introduction of self-applied tourniquets and topical haemostatics, together with 
advances to replace circulatory volume (adult intraosseous infusion) and treat the 
associated coagulopathy (damage control resuscitation; haemostatic resuscitation). 
 
Recent evidence confirms the importance of external haemorrhage control, with 31% 
of potentially avoidable US military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan attributed to 
compressible wounds (Kelly et al 2008). What is less well represented on this model 
is that 69% of potentially avoidable haemorrhage deaths in this series are from non-
compressible haemorrhage in the thorax and abdomen. 
 
Hypoxia from airway obstruction is a widely accepted cause of early avoidable death. 
Primary blast to the thorax has been recognised to cause reversible apnoea since 
1942, related to vagal stimulation (Sawdon et al 2002). The homunculus casualty 
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therefore has a large airway. Skills given to individual soldiers to open and clear the 
airway and provide supportive ventilation until the patient starts to breathe are 
founded in credible science. 
 
The US military also places a high emphasis on tension pneumothorax, providing 
equipment for needle thoracoscentesis far forward at the level of ‘Combat 
Lifesaver’—a non-medical soldier trained in advanced first aid (the UK equivalent 
being the ‘Army Team Medic’). This decision is based on Vietnam War data that 
identifies tension pneumothorax as a cause of death in up to 4% cases (McPherson 
et al 2006). Diagnosis is known to be subjective, with civilian pre-hospital series 
demonstrating wide variability from 0.7% to 30%, and in patients breathing 
spontaneously it is typically a gradual onset (Leigh-Smith and Harris 2005). 
Contemporary UK military data has not demonstrated any significant prevalence of 
tension pneumothorax in immediate trauma deaths (Hodgetts et al 2007, Paper 12) 
and consequently no need for intervention by non-medical soldiers. Rather, the UK 
approach recognises the potential for failure of needle thoracoscentesis and the 
potential for unintentional harm with non-professional intervention. 
 
It is a reasonable deduction that the homunculus casualty is different in these two 
military populations and the prevalence of tension pneumothorax has altered 
between conflicts as a result of improved thoracic protection (body armour), and/or a 
change in injury mechanism (the balance between blast:gunshot:blunt injuries) 
and/or a change in the perceived presence of the condition (criteria used for 
diagnosis). Every future campaign may be expected to develop its own homunculus 
as the weapons, external environment and enemy modus operandi change. The 
medical challenge is having systems in place that facilitate adaptation by recognising 
the evolving injury patterns and providing iterative feedback on the impact of 
changing both protective measures and treatments. 
 
A limitation of the homunculus casualty is that it is an anatomical model and does not 
represent pain, which is a ubiquitous component of serious injury. Battlefield 
analgesia has been serially identified as a weakness in contemporary capability 
(Hodgetts et al 2006; Hodgetts and Findlay 2012) despite commercial off-the-shelf 
solutions and published internal innovation—rather it remains substantially 
entrenched in the same approach applied during the First World War. Figure 6.2 
adapts the model in an attempt to include this key component of injury. 
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Figure 6.2: Homunculus Casualty—adapted to include pain 
  
6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has drawn together the evidence to answer the research questions and 
prove a Revolution in Military Medical Affairs (RM2A), and to prove I have made a 
substantial contribution to the medical knowledge and understanding that underpins 
the concepts and practices driving the revolution. There is also proof, through the 
Homunculus Casualty Theorem, that developmental effort has been focused 
appropriately and proportionately to find novel treatment approaches to improve 
outcome from the most likely consequences of combat injury. 
 
It is now relevant to look to the future to determine the requirement for continued 
revolution and to establish how the advances in war can enhance our civilian 
healthcare systems in peace. 
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7 Future direction 
 
In determining the future direction to further develop combat casualty care capability 
and the transfer of learning to civilian trauma systems the following questions require 
answers: 
 
§ How does civilian trauma system performance benchmark against the military 
system? 
§ How can advances in combat casualty care be transferred into civilian 
healthcare system benefits?  
§ What have been the conditions for revolution and will these conditions 
endure? 
§ What have been the unintended consequences of revolution and how will 
these shape future direction? 
§ What is the future character of military medicine and how will this influence 
capability development? 
§ What are the future research opportunities stemming from this study? 
 
7.1 Benchmarking performance 
Paper 17 
OPERATIONS 
(PERFORMANCE) 
Hodgetts T, Davies S, Russell R, McLeod J. 
Benchmarking the UK military deployed trauma system. 
J Roy Army Med Corps 2007a; 153(4): 237-8. 
 
The concept of a strategic drift developing between UK military and civilian major 
trauma capabilities was introduced in Section 1.6 and expressed in Figure 1.2. 
Further, the cohort of survivors of combat injury that are judged likely to have died if 
managed within a civilian system were described in Section 4.6.1, with sub-analysis 
of the improved military system performance for traumatic cardiac arrest presented in 
Section 4.6.2.  
 
Paper 17 (Hodgetts et al 2007a, p.238) provides greater understanding of the detail 
of how the systems benchmark and states that:  
 
‘While there is no doubting there are pockets of exemplary trauma practice in 
the NHS, the inconsistent and generally poor standard of national care that 
	   92 
NCEPOD17 describes reflects an NHS culture that fails to assign the same 
importance to the systemic management of major trauma as the DMS.’  
 
The evidence for this assertion comes from a contrast of the seniority of the trauma 
team leader out of hours (a resident, 24-hour consultant-led team in all cases in the 
military compared with 3.3% of 183 civilian hospitals); inadequate pre-hospital, 
physician-delivered airway management (80.6% of military major trauma retrieved by 
a physician-led helicopter team compared with 11.7% civilian cases), and poor 
supervision of on-going case management (only 40% of NHS cases were reviewed 
by a consultant within 12 hours, compared to all field hospital cases managed by an 
integrated military consultant team from the outset). 
 
7.2 Civilian adoption of military innovation 
The clinical and political imperative to continuously develop combat casualty care 
standards has been a sustained casualty load on campaign operations. This 
imperative will likely be greatly diminished in a shrinking military organisation that 
returns to preparing for contingency operations in an age of austerity. The survival of 
the learned clinical practices is therefore dependent on them being absorbed into the 
NHS. The assumption is that all the novel practices are relevant to the civilian 
context. 
 
There is historical precedent in transferring military medical innovation in conflict to 
civilian healthcare benefits in peace: Box 7.1 describes medical ‘revolutionary’ 
advances over the last 350 years and draws comparison with contemporary 
innovations. The key success factor is to understand why adoption of innovation may 
predictably fail and to overcome the barriers. 
 
In 2011 the Chief Executive of NHS stated the importance of placing innovation at 
the heart of NHS culture and processes. In the associated strategic document, 
Innovation, Health and Wealth (NHS 2011), the predictable barriers to innovation 
adoption were described (Figure 7.1). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcomes and Deaths, 2007 
	   93 
 
Ì The treatment of war wounds with egg yolk and turpentine, rather than boiling oil, by Ambroise Paré 
in the mid-16th century (Paget 1897): a benchmark for the haemostatic wound dressings QuikClot® 
and HemCon® introduced in 2005-6.  
Ì The introduction by Baron Larrey, Napoleon’s Surgeon Marshall, of ‘flying ambulances’ 
(ambulances volantes) a dedicated horse and cart manned with litter-bearers for the rapid 
evacuation of casualties from the battlefield (Crumplin 2007): a benchmark for the specialist 
medical helicopter-borne team (a ‘flying ambulance’) enhanced in 2006. 
Ì The invention of anaesthesia in 1846 to relieve suffering during operative procedures and give the 
surgeon appropriate conditions for a careful procedure: a benchmark for the benefits of forward 
anaesthesia during primary helicopter retrieval, coupled with process changes to allow immediate, 
anaesthetic-assisted resuscitation on the operating table for the most critical casualties. 
Ì The use of the Thomas traction splint in WW1, a simple technology advance that reduced mortality 
related to open fracture of the femur from 80% to 16% (Robinson 2009): a benchmark for the 
impact of introducing one-handed, self-application tourniquets to individual soldiers from 2006 as a 
simple, life-saving technology. 
Ì The recognition by the Medical Research Committee (later Medical Research Council) formed in 
1913 of the importance of capturing and analysing data on injuries, illnesses and treatment during 
war (Loudon 2001): a benchmark for the development of a sophisticated trauma governance 
system, reliant on progressively detailed data collection from 1999. 
Ì The pressure of clinical needs driving therapeutic and pharmacological advances in WW2, in 
particular the development of blood transfusion techniques and commercial production of penicillin: 
a benchmark for the advances in massive transfusion therapy from 2007, including technology for 
pre-hospital administration of blood, harvesting fresh platelets from donors on operations, improved 
monitoring of patient response (thromboelastography), and novel drugs (recombinant Factor VIIa). 
 
Box 7.1: Historical Medical Advances and Contemporary Parallels 
 
In direct comparison, the principal reasons for successful military adoption of 
innovation can be highlighted—access to high quality evidence, data and metrics 
through the Joint Theatre Trauma Registry; and the capability and tools of senior 
officers to drive change. The leadership culture to support creativity and evidence-
based innovation has shifted: in the Cold War there was a predominantly 
bureaucratic leadership culture, which has necessarily evolved to an adaptive 
approach within a sustained campaign. The reality is that a reduction in operational 
activity will favour a return to bureaucracy. 
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10 — INNOVATION, HEALTH AND WEALTH 
The NHS is full of talented people with brilliant ideas. But 
the benefit of this collective creative energy has not been 
fully realised because these ideas and inventions have not 
always been systematically and rapidly spread throughout 
the service as a whole.
The UK is particularly slow, relative to other developed 
economies, in adopting innovative medical technologies. 
Despite its pioneering work on the early development of 
MRI scanners, the UK has only 500 out of a worldwide 
total of 20,000, performing less than 2% of the world’s 
60m scans each year, at only two-thirds of the international 
average use per machine.
C
1950
British physiologist Richard Doll discovers link between lung cancer and smoking
It took five years before half of adult patients admitted to 
NHS acute care received a venous thromboembolism (VTE) 
risk assessment, despite a death rate estimated at 24,000 
people every year. But when it was made a national clinical 
priority, risk assessment was routine for 84% of admissions 
within a year.
BARRIERS TO DIFFUSION
The reasons for the slow spread of innovation are well 
documented, and have been reiterated in the responses  
we received during the course of this Review. 
While understanding the barriers is important, the focus of 
the Review has been on developing solutions to those barriers. 
 Barriers to innovation in the NHS
DIFFUSION
1
5
2
36
4
POOR ACCESS TO 
EVIDENCE, DATA AND METRICS
INSUFFICIENT  
RECOGNITION AND 
CELEBRATION OF INNOVATION 
AND INNOVATORS
FINANCIAL 
LEVERS DO NOT
REWARD INNOVATORS 
AND CAN ACT AS 
A DISINCENTIVE 
TO ADOPTION 
AND DIFFUSION
  LACK OF EFFECTIVE 
AND SYSTEMATIC  
INNOVATION 
  ARCHITECTURE
LEADERSHIP CULTURE TO 
SUPPORT INNOVATION IS 
INCONSISTENT OR LACKING
COMMISSIONERS LACK  
THE TOOLS OR CAPABILITY  
TO DRIVE INNOVATION
 
Figure 7.1: Barriers to Innovation Adoption within the NHS 
[Reproduced from INNOVATION HEALTH AND WEALTH, NHS 2011] 
 
7.3 Conditions for Revolution 
There are two domains in which favourable conditions have fostered revolutionary 
change—these are the political and the socio-cultural. What must be understood is 
whether these conditions will endure to sustain progressive future developments. 
 
The political rationale to drive RM2A has already been partly established within the 
context of the Strategic Defence Review 1998 and post-operational analysis of the 
campaign in Kosovo: the DMS was severely undermanned and perceived to be 
incapable of adequately supporting major combat operations (HCDC 1999). There is 
a link to the observation that militaries can endure innovation stagnation if they are 
non-operational and, as Loo states, how it is ‘no surprise that the most active 
militaries (US, UK, Israel) are those demonstrating transformation’ (Loo 2009, p.95): 
campaigns in the Balkans generated casualties, but it is the sustained and high 
volume of dead and injured from the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns that have 
provided the DMS with a continuous political imperative to transform.  
 
Colin Gray claims that the social and cultural circumstances are more important than 
technological advances in influencing change (Gray 2006). Extending his analysis, it 
is both the internal organisational cultures and external societal cultures that 
influence the atmosphere for change. Internal organisational culture was forced to 
change with the introduction of Emergency Medicine as a specialty in 1994 and its 
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first operational deployment in 1999: this marked the beginning of a new specialist 
professional ‘ownership’ of a system of emergency care from point of wounding to 
the field hospital. But a clinical cultural change alone was probably insufficient to 
overcome the traditional bureaucratic conservatism that could be viewed as a brake 
on innovation—how then has the balance that favours institutional risk aversion been 
tipped in favour of accepting profound changes? This may be attributed to a societal 
shift towards casualty aversion. 
 
The literature is rich with analysis of the culture of casualty aversion and the 
correlation between rising casualty numbers and diminishing public support. Annual 
UK casualty numbers steadily rose in Afghanistan from 2006-2010: it is therefore 
logical to deduce that growing public concern has encouraged political support for 
changes that are expected to improve clinical outcomes. It is also logical, but 
contestable, to assert that society will be even less tolerant of body bags when the 
context is not perceived to be a war of necessity—but rather one of choice 
(Afghanistan), or even an ‘unjust’ war (second Gulf War). Indirect evidence of the 
impact of a heightened casualty aversion culture is the absence of any reduction in 
the DMS capability within the deep cuts associated with the 2010 Strategic Defence 
Review (UK MoD 2010).  
 
Society’s relationship to the injured soldier has therefore probably changed in regard 
to discretionary wars, and has tangibly changed in regard to the expectation of 
casualties’ survival. Such a change in the relationship of the ‘game’ to society itself is 
identified as a mark of a true revolution. However, without casualties being sustained 
in the future, society’s attention will be distracted, the political priority will predictably 
wane and military medical services will become vulnerable for cost-saving initiatives. 
 
7.4 Consequences of Revolution 
The intended consequences of reforming Defence’s combat casualty care capability 
are clear from the outset: improved standards of clinical care with measurable 
improvement in outcomes. What have become apparent are the unintended clinical 
and logistic consequences. Principal amongst these is an unexpected growing cohort 
of severely disabled double or triple amputees, often with associated genital injury. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to debate this dimension in detail, but reflection 
reveals ethical and social dilemmas.  
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7.4.1 Ethical challenges 
Chief among the ethical challenges is to consider whether medicine to treat combat 
casualties has advanced too far (Box 7.2). Can it be considered ‘inappropriate’ to 
continue resuscitation at the field hospital (based on an assessment of severe 
morbidity), even if it can be ‘successful’ (return of signs of life)? This is an unasked 
question where political, personal, societal, medico-legal and spiritual answers are 
likely to differ. 
 
 
Has 
medicine 
advanced 
too  
far 
that we can save 
    a     man’s life    who 
   has    only one      limb 
and no 
balls? 
●● 
If 
asked    would 
most       soldiers 
               prefer 
              to  
__________DIE___ 
than to live this life? 
THAT TAKES BALLS.     
                                                                                     
 
Box 7.2: ‘Balls’, © TJ Hodgetts 2008 
 
Furthermore, should soldiers maintain a Living Will if they do not want to be 
resuscitated when catastrophically injured? And is society prepared to shoulder the 
burden of responsibility for additional lifetime physical and psychological support for 
the severely disabled survivors?  
 
An additional enduring ethical friction when treating civilian casualties of conflict 
within the military system is whether to be a doctor or a soldier first—this is referred 
to as ‘mixed agency theory’ (Thomasma, 2003). As a good doctor it is necessary to 
place the requirements of the patient and the consequences for the patient at the 
centre of all decisions, a virtuous approach known as teleology or consequentialism. 
Where rules are used to assist these optimal clinical decisions it is utilitarianism. As a 
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good soldier it is necessary to give primacy to the requirements of the Commander 
and maintaining the Commander’s flexibility and freedom of military action—this is 
deontology, where duty, integrity and compliance with legal orders is the driving 
motivation. This enduring tension is represented in Figure 7.2 
 
Figure 7.2: The Tension of Mixed Agency Theory 
 
The motivation within this thesis to champion serial changes to improve the quality of 
combat casualty care demonstrates a teleological framework. The invention of ‘rules’ 
and their widespread distribution18 (Section 3.5.3) reveals a utilitarian approach. The 
personal tension I have had to balance with the medical imperative versus the 
military imperative is illustrated in vignettes from my experience as a Field Hospital 
Medical Director (Mahoney, Hodgetts et al 2011) and in the original war poem in 
Box 7.3. 
 
7.4.2 Sustainability of heroic medicine 
A new culture of heroic operational medicine has evolved, where the maximum effort 
is expended for every soldier all of the time, applying the full weight of the 
transformational processes described. The sustainability of this approach is 
questionable. The DMS has been a high consumer of national blood product stocks: 
a change in national strategy to sustain stock levels would be predictable if the NHS 
moves towards the aggressive resuscitation approach that has contributed to 
improved combat casualty survival. Additionally, high casualty rates in a Major 
Combat Operation would potentially rapidly outstrip blood resources if heroic 
resuscitation is widely followed. In this situation it would be essential to manage the 
expectations of military commanders, politicians and the public. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 ‘Trauma Rules’ has been translated into Italian and Japanese; ‘MIMMS’ and the ‘Major Incident Management 
System’ have been translated into Japanese, Swedish, Italian and Dutch. 
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1 
Admit: don’t admit? 
There’s one bed left: an injured child, 
Fell down a well, 
Is very sick, 
But there’s a TIC, 
I feel compelled,  
For soldiers’ sake, to hold that bed. 
Admit: don’t admit? 
 
2 
Treat: don’t treat? 
He’s got no legs, his heart has stopped, 
Stood on a mine, 
Will likely die, 
But shall I try? 
Two out of nine 
Will get pulse back; we’ve changed the odds. 
Treat: don’t treat? 
 
3 
Live: or let die? 
We’ve tried for hours, he won’t respond, 
Fresh donor blood 
Was our last card. 
Though it is hard 
I won’t, but could, 
Lack courage, not accept the end. 
Live: or let die? 
 
 
Box 7.3: ‘Ethical Choices’, © TJ Hodgetts 2009 
TIC = Troops In Contact 
 
7.5 Continuing the Revolution 
Unpacking the consequences of revolutionary change reveals an additional set of 
challenging questions that relate to future direction. Does the DMS need to stay at 
the forefront of trauma care, or is being as good as the NHS good enough? Would 
military commanders generally accept the lesser standard, or would this impinge 
unacceptably on the moral component of fighting power? Is research investment to 
further develop capability justifiable when austerity savings are a national 
imperative? What this boils down to is two simple questions—should we continue 
progress and can we continue progress? 
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There is a moral argument that as war creates the environment for clinical innovation 
it should be exploited to its full potential as there are ultimately benefits to the whole 
of society. The counter-argument relates to cost in an age of austerity. Senior 
national academics have recommended that MoD research should bear the brunt of 
research cost savings (Sample 2010) to protect civilian research investments. In the 
case of health this would be a false economy, at least as long as combat operations 
continue and the political imperative for optimal casualty care endures. 
 
A sensible compromise would be to determine those areas where maintaining 
primary research is considered essential, through the need to protect a national 
capability or where no other country has the expertise, and those areas where 
external innovation can be exploited. An example of retaining national capability is 
large animal blast injury modelling, where the Dstl [sic] has the world-leading 
capability. Conversely, an example of exploiting external innovation is haemostatic 
bandage technology: here research and development (R&D) has been effectively 
‘outsourced’ to industry, while the military retains a horizon scanning process and a 
process for reliable evaluation before ‘creatively swiping’ any future new product. The 
benefit lies in the R&D costs lying externally, together with avoiding the risk of 
unanticipated side effects following early clinical application.  
 
From the UK perspective the haemostatic agent WoundStat® bears witness to this 
example. The agent was prematurely widely introduced into US military, but then 
embarrassingly withdrawn due to side effects (NBC News 2008; Kheirabadi et al 
2010). UK’s caution not to over-expeditiously adopt what was superficially an 
advance in capability was wise in retrospect. 
 
Developing this theme of cost-effective innovation, Max Boot (2006) makes the 
pragmatic observation that it may not take a lot of money to innovate, particularly in 
concepts and processes, as the financial investment relates more to product 
invention. He encourages this smart innovation that adds value at little cost.  
 
The thesis draws out examples where smart innovation has occurred. However, it 
has not yet explained how the integrated changes for acute trauma care, across the 
Defence Lines of Development, have been used as a stimulus to drive systematic 
change to improve the neglected area of operational primary health care. 
Specifically, I have led an academic review of deployed Role 1 capability (Hodgetts 
& Findlay, 2012a and 2012b) that has identified areas for training, doctrine and 
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governance improvement at little cost, although recognises the requirement for 
financial investment in equipment and infrastructure to modernise Role 1 for future 
contingencies. Central to this is an understanding of how the evolving character of 
military medicine should be at the heart of shaping future capability. 
 
7.5.1 Future Character of Military Medicine 
War is recognised to have an enduring nature, but an evolving character (British 
Army, 2011). In parallel, rational medicine has an enduring nature (to save life, 
relieve suffering and prevent further harm), but a changing character that is shaped 
by enhanced scientific understanding, emergent technologies, and both political and 
social expectations for healthcare.  
 
The Future Character of Conflict (UK MoD, 2010) has been described in the context 
of an environment that is congested, cluttered, contested, connected and 
constrained. The same lens may be applied to a novel analysis of the Future 
Character of Military Medicine (FCOMM), but the emphasis is unequal and the image 
is incomplete: to bring clarity to the vision of FCOMM it is proposed the precepts of 
analysis of the future environment are modified to be ‘confused, complex, 
constrained, collaborative, contested, connected and congested’ (Figure 7.1).  
 
 
Figure 7.1: The Future Character of Military Medicine 
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An understanding of FCOMM (Hodgetts & Findlay, 2012a & 2012b; Hodgetts 2012) 
is important if future clinical capability changes are to be focused on predictable 
operational need and contextualised within what is the accepted evolution of the 
future character of conflict. Beaty (1997) understood the value of predicting how 
changes in the external environment (geostrategy, information technology, medical 
practice) may result in RM2A, but there is no evidence that this forethought was used 
as a framework to drive capability development. His vision that military medical care 
on operations up to 2015 would focus on developing ‘enhanced first responders, 
including a more capable combat lifesaver and a team of “brilliant medics” ’ (Beaty 
1997, p.63) has been realised. However, the prediction that field hospitals would ‘do 
the minimum necessary to keep a soldier alive until he or she can be evacuated…for 
definitive treatment’ (Beaty 1997, p.69) has proven not to withstand the sustained 
momentum to drive up standards of combat casualty care beyond civilian healthcare 
norms. 
 
7.6 Future research opportunities 
Before turning to the final conclusions of the thesis it is appropriate to consider what 
principal research opportunities have been identified in the analysis. These are: 
 
1. Understanding whether taught disaster principles match the genuine 
requirement during an incident; 
2. Quantifying the effect of time on clinical outcome within the contemporary 
combat casualty care system; 
3. Measuring the impact of regionalisation of civilian trauma on improvement in 
outcome, and; 
4. Measuring the effectiveness and impact of knowledge transfer from the 
military trauma system to the civilian trauma system. 
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8 Conclusions 
This thesis set out to determine whether advances in combat casualty care constitute 
a Revolution in Military Medical Affairs (RM2A) and specifically whether there has 
been a radical change in the character or practice of military medicine. The evidence 
demonstrates that a revolution can be claimed, within the accepted sentinel criteria—
Lambeth’s (1997) criteria for a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); Cohen’s (2009) 
three tests for an RMA, but adapted for an RM2A; and Toffler’s (1993) criteria for a 
‘true revolution’.  This RM2A is responsible for the unexpected and unprecedented 
positive outcomes following critical combat injury. 
 
The thesis also set out to qualitatively appraise my contribution to revolutionary 
change, through prior publication. The range of publications selected demonstrates 
leadership of this revolutionary process through sustained personal innovation to 
create concepts, heuristics, guidelines, national and international training 
programmes and systematic governance of the military trauma system. 
 
The Homunculus Casualty Theorem has been proposed in order to evaluate whether 
developmental effort has been proportional and appropriate to the clinical risks 
encountered. The theory is largely proven, if only for the pattern of injuries seen 
within the current Afghanistan campaign. UK Defence has adapted to the 
Afghanistan homunculus, through changes in combat tactics, body armour, vehicle 
protective systems and treatment practices to optimise the outcome for a campaign-
specific pattern of injuries. A subtly or profoundly different homunculus casualty can 
be expected for every future campaign. I have been responsible for establishing the 
adaptive systems for future success—the Joint Theatre Trauma Registry and the 
Joint Theatre Clinical Case Conference.  
 
Where the Homunculus Casualty Theorem shows a failure to match clinical need to 
systems development is in battlefield analgesia. I undertook an academic review of 
battlefield analgesia in 2006, publishing recommendations for clinical change 
(Hodgetts et al 2006) from a standard unchanged for 100 years: these were not 
accepted institutionally. In an academic review of Role 1 capability 6 years later I 
have stated that ‘Inadequate analgesia at Role 1 is an intolerable capability failing, 
consistently and objectively identified on operations…The institutional resistance to 
employing alternative analgesia to intramuscular morphine needs to be overcome’ 
(Hodgetts & Findlay 2012a, p.9). This has generated traction, with change being 
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accelerated to implement transmucosal fentanyl as a standard Role 1 analgesia 
option. What this demonstrates is that some change demands persistence and a 
refusal to compromise. To paraphrase George Bernard Shaw (1903), all progress 
depends on the unreasonable man. 
 
The conditions for continuing revolution in combat casualty care have endured with 
the sustained operational tempo, but they are fragile. A decline in casualty numbers 
on planned cessation of combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014 will predictably 
dilute the agenda for further change. Heroic operational medicine may need to be 
reigned-in for high intensity conflict, and may be undeliverable to the same standard 
in a new early entry operation with a limited medical footprint.  
 
The NHS has demonstrated a repeated failure to transform its trauma services 
between 1988 and 2007, when presented with evidence from national surgical 
institutions. The catalyst to begin transformation and regionalise trauma services has 
been the poor performance reiterated in the NCEPOD (2007) report. The opportunity 
for future military resilience to generate comparable standards of expeditionary 
trauma care lies with transferring knowledge to this developing civilian nationwide 
system of regional trauma centres and, in particular, to the established military-
civilian Role 4 partnership in Birmingham. However, the ethical, policy, logistic and 
economic implications for the NHS adopting the heroic stance on trauma 
resuscitation cannot be underestimated and are referred to as the ‘blowback’ from 
innovation (Lin, 2010). 
 
I have also presented evidence of how to identify and prevent avoidable in-hospital 
cardiac arrest. Despite best efforts to personally influence change across the NHS 
through adoption of a nationally distributed educational initiative, the same systemic 
failure has been proven 10 years later. It is hoped that as NCEPOD has been the 
catalyst for organisational change across NHS for major trauma (NCEPOD 2007), its 
report of 2012 on avoidable in-hospital cardiac arrest will provide a parallel stimulus. 
 
The National Clinical Director for Trauma Care for NHS England told the National 
Audit Office in 2010 that ‘the organisation and facilities of Camp Bastion field hospital 
[Afghanistan] are equivalent to NHS best practice for trauma care’ (NAO, 2010, 
p.16). The National Clinical Director is mistaken. In relation to trauma, the 
organisation, facilities and outcomes in a British field hospital during an extended 
campaign now exceed NHS best practice. An obligation rests with the DMS to 
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effectively transfer organisational learning—but most importantly, for the sake of the 
sacrifice of our fallen and injured soldiers, an obligation rests with the NHS to 
overcome the known barriers to innovation adoption to benefit the injured of the 
future. 
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